

استاد لافچاسوسی

شماره ۱۴

دخالت‌های آمریکا در ایران



داسجویان مسلمان پیرو خط امام

CONFIDENTIAL

73-31A - 44-41

PLAGE: SPATY 2/12/77
 APPR#: PCN:CAANAAS
 DRETOR: POL:CR CAMERA
 CLEAR#: NONE
 CISTR: POL-3 443 PCN
 PCON-2 PM ICA
 CM ADM OF
 DAO AFOSI CHRO

1. IC - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON FIRST DAY FOLLOWING, SUCCESSFUL TAKEOVER OF GOVERNMENT BY REVOLUTIONARY FORCES UNDER AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI SHOOTING AND A DEGREE OF INSECURITY CONTINUE IN TEHRAN. WE HAVE NO NEWS AS OF 11 A.M. OF WHAT MAY HAVE HAPPENED BY BOWS IN TAPPEH AIR FORCE BASE FOLLOWING REPORTS LATE LAST NIGHT THAT IMPERIAL GUARDS WERE ON THEIR WAY TO MEET THE BATTLE WITH AIR FORCE THERE. HOWEVER, THAT APPEARS CALM TODAY AND MAIN AREA OF FIGHTING IS AROUND IMPERIAL GUARD BARRACKS IN LAVISAN. LARGE NUMBERS OF ARMY HAVE BEEN PASSED OUT INDISTINGUISHABLY TO CIVILIANS. ARMY ARE BEING SENT TO ASSIST IN THE SIEGE OF AL QUBA. ARMY HAS SUCCEEDED IN GETTING BACK ITS EARLIER FALSE REPORT THAT AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WERE SHOT IN LAVISAN WITH IMPERIAL GUARD. THE CITY SEEMS TO BE IN THE HANDS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT WITH ROAD BLOCKS IN MANY PLACES BY ARMY'S POLICE, WHO APPEAR TO BE MUJAHEDDIN TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT.

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3. SAVAK OFFICERS AND PRISONS WERE "FORCIBLY LIBERATED" YESTERDAY, AND SOME OF THEM MAY STILL BE CONTINUING. SAVAK PRISONS SUGGEST SAVAK OFFICIALS AND OTHERS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY RATHER THAN KILLED. AMROFF NEAR SUPREME COMMANDER'S HEADQUARTERS REPORTS ARMED MEN CALLING OUT NAMES OF PEOPLE AND SHOOTING AT HOUSES WHEN THE PEOPLE DON'T COME OUT. UNKNOWN WHAT DISPOSITION KING MADE OF HIS PEOPLE. OPPOSITION SOURCE TELLS US COMMITTEE TO RESTORE KING IS A DEAL BY KOMMUNIST PARTY SPS CHIEF. GENERAL ORANI. ALL AMERICANS APPEAR TO BE SAFE, WITH GROUP COMING FROM COM HEADQUARTERS THIS MORNING TALKING ABOUT IN AMBASSY COMPOUND DURING THE NIGHT.

4. THERE ARE NO SIGNS OF REVIVER LEFTIST INFLUENCE THAN YESTERDAY. AIR INDEX AND GUERRILLA NEWS FAIRLY FREQUENT, AND OCCASIONAL ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS. WE UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT AFTER A PRIVATE RADIO STATION CAME ON THE AIR WITH SOME ANTI-AMERICAN ANNOUNCEMENT, NIRT IMMEDIATELY CANCELLED IT A DAY SAYING THERE WAS NO INTENTION OF GOVERNMENT TO ATTACK AMERICANS, AND PEOPLE SHOULD HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT. THIS FITS IN WITH LAST NIGHT'S MESSAGE TO THE NATION FROM KHOMEINI WHICH CALLED FOR MARCHING AGAINST PRO-IMPERIALIST AND SPECIFICALLY THE AMERICAN EMBASSY SHOULD TAKE PLACE. HE SAID THE NATION WAS NEARLY WON, BUT PEOPLE SHOULD REMAIN CALM UNTIL 15. NIRT ANNOUNCED THAT IMPERIAL GUARD WOULD BE OUT THIS MORNING.

5. AIR INDEX CONSTATES REPORT SITUATION CALM AND AMERICANS SAFE. TAPPI IS BEING PROTECTED BY ISLAMIC GUARD AND EFFECTS A VISIT FROM LOCAL AYATOLLAH WITH NIRT YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. ISLAMIC REMAINS PLUGGED IN WITH AMERICAN FAMILY AND OFFICIALS. TROOPS REMAIN IN POSITION. WAITING WITH GOVERNMENT. AMROFF REPORTS THAT YERO TELLS US ALL AMERICANS WERE SAFE AND UNHARMED. TAPPI REPORTS THAT PEOPLE ARE IN CONTROL THERE AS WELL.

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7. WE HAVE REPORTS JAMSLICE PRISON WAS BROKEN INTO
BY A TYPE, JAMSLICE AND PEOPLE SEIZED AMONG OTHERS.
LSC REPORTS THAT PEOPLE ARE BEING ENCOURAGED TO
HEADQUARTERS OF NEW REVOLUTIONARY
IN SHOWING HEADQUARTERS AREA AT THE
IS. COURTYARD IS SAID TO BE FULL
OF WEAPONS AND THE POLICE STATION.

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9. BY MIDDAY ICA BUILDING ENTERED AND RANSACKED. INTER-
CONTINENTAL HOTEL ALSO TAKEN OVER, WITH ANY JOURNALISTS
WHO WERE ROUNDED UP OUT OF THEIR ROOMS. HILTON REPORTEDLY
WAS ENTERED. NATIONAL EMPLOYEES TALKED MARAUDING
GROUPS OF CIVILIANS OUT OF THEIR DESIRE TO "INSPECT"
EMBASSY COMPOUND. ALL TOP PEOPLE OF BAZARGAN ARE IN
REVOLUTIONARY H.Q., PROTECTED BY HUNDREDS OF ARMED MEN
WHO ALLOW NO ONE TO APPROACH WITHOUT PASSWORD. SINCE
TELEPHONE NUMBERS ARE CONTINUOUSLY BUSY, ALL HIGH COMMAND
IS EFFECTIVELY OUT OF CONTACT. OPPOSITION SOURCE WHO
WAS HIMSELF UNABLE TO GET IN SINCE HE HAS NO PASSWORD
TELLS US TOP GENERALS, INCLUDING IMPERIAL GUARD COMMANDER
BADR, WHO SURRENDERED THIS MORNING, ARE ALL IN REVOLU-
TIONARY H.Q. TOO.
9. 25 AMERICAN MAC EMPLOYEES (ONE EMBASSY EMPLOYEE
AMONG THEM) HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY BY ISLAMIC POLICE,
AND WE ARE TRYING TO GET TO THEM THROUGH KHOMEINI CAMP
INTERMEDIARY. MORE PRIVATE AMERICANS BEING ROUNDED UP
AND TAKEN TO SOME CENTRAL PLACE, PROBABLY KHOMEINI-
BAZARGAN H.Q., WE ASSUME FOR QUESTIONING. THIS APPEARS
TO BE A PATTERN.

10. TABRIZ REPORTS AT 2 P.M. LOCAL QUITE A BIT OF
SECURING - PERHAPS CELEBRATORY. AT LEAST TWO MEMBERS
OF SAVAK REPORTEDLY LYNCHED BY MOBS EARLY THIS MORNING
FROM TREE ON TABRIZ MAIN STREET, EYEWITNESS REPORTS.
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 050133Z

E.O. 12065-1, 050133Z (TOMSETT, VL) OR-P

PAGE: PENDING

SUBJ: POLITICAL FRACTIONALIZATION

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE BROADSPEAD SENSE OF UNITY IN OPPOSITION TO THE PAHLAVI REGIME TENDED TO MASK THE REALITY OF THE IRANIAN POLITY. WITH THE COLLAPSE OF THE PAHLAVI SYSTEM, THAT REALITY-- A PRONOUNCED PROCLIVITY FOR POLITICAL FRACTIONALIZATION-- WAS RAPIDLY REASSERTED ITSELF. THIS FRACTIONALIZATION IS NOT SIMPLY VERTICAL, I.E., AN IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION BETWEEN THE MARXIST LEFT AND THE ISLAMIC RIGHT, BUT, RATHER, MULTI-DIRECTIONAL. THIS ACCOUNTS BOTH FOR ODD ALLIANCES SUCH AS THAT BETWEEN SOME MEMBERS OF THE ISLAMIC MOJAHEDIN-E-KHALQ AND THE MARXIST FEDAYIN-E-KHALQ ON THE ISSUE OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE REGULAR ARMED SERVICES AND THEIR REPLACEMENT BY A "PEOPLE'S ARMY" AND THE APPARENT ANOMALY OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT'S SLOW PROGRESS IN ASSERTING ITS AUTHORITY IN THE WAKE OF THE REVOLUTION'S LIGHTNING VICTORY OVER THE OLD REGIME.

3. THE TYPES OF DIVISIONS WHICH HAVE EMERGED IN THE LAST TWO YEARS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A) IDEOLOGICAL, WITH THE MOST SIGNIFICANT GROUPS BEING SECULAR MARXISTS AND PROponents OF A GOVERNMENT BASED ON FUNDAMENTALIST INTERPRETATION OF ISLAMIC TENETS. HOWEVER, IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE FALL OF THE BAHTHIAR GOVERNMENT, NON-MARXIST BUT CLEARLY SECULARIST, MODERNIST POLITICAL SENTIMENT WAS BEGINNING TO COALESCE INTO A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL FORCE. THE SUDDEN AND ALMOST UNIVERSALLY UNEXPECTED COLLAPSE OF THE FORMER REGIME THREW THE ELEMENTS WHICH COMPOSED THIS POLITICAL MIDDLE GROUND INTO TOTAL DISARRAY. "MAJORITY" HAS LITTLE MEANING IN THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE OF FLUIDITY WHERE THE VERY UNCERTAINTY OF THE POLITICAL FUTURE CAN RESULT IN RAPID SHIFTS OF ALLEGIANCE, BUT THE TERM HAS AT LEAST POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THOSE IRANIANS (FOR THE MOST PART LARGELY SILENT) WHO HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT EITHER THE BAHTHIAR OR THE RIGHT OR LEFT.

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DE MINIMO, MOST IMMEDIATELY EVIDENT IN THE DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY EMANATING FROM KURDISTAN. THERE ARE A VARIETY OF DISTINCT GROUPS, DISTINCT BASED ON LINGUISTIC DIFFERENCES (THE TURKI SPEAKERS OF AZERBAIJAN AND THE ARABIC SPEAKERS OF KHUZESTAN) AND/OR COGNITIONAL DIFFERENCES (THE SHUMLI YARDS AND BALUCHIS), WHICH HAVE TRADITIONALLY VIEWED THEMSELVES AS APART FROM MAINSTREAM IRANIAN CULTURE, AND DURING PERIODS OF WEAKNESS AT THE CENTER HAVE COME TO ASSERT VARIOUS DEGREES OF INDEPENDENCE FROM IT. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT IN AREAS SUCH AS KURDISTAN HAS GROWN, CIRCUMSTANCES FOR PARTICULARIST SENTIMENTS TO SURFACE ONCE AGAIN. FOLLOWING AS THE FRUIT OF THE GENERAL CONSEQUENT REGARDING AN INDEPENDENT AND, ESPECIALLY IS, THE DISCREPANCY IS LIKELY TO GROW IN INTENSITY.

2) ADMINISTRATION, AS CHARACTERIZED BY THE DNA SYSTEM OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES. WHILE AN APPARENT SOURCE SAID ON 17 FEBRUARY 20 THAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN DISBANDING THE LATTER AND TURNING ALL ADMINISTRATION FUNCTIONS OVER TO THE FORMER, THE SAME SOURCE INDICATED THAT THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEES ARE BEING DISBANDED AND NEW, LARGER, BUREAU, GOVERNMENT OFFICES. THIS MAY BE A RESULT OF A POLICY OF DECENTRALIZATION. THIS MAY ALSO BE A RESULT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO ALSO BELONG TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES WHO HAVE NOW JOINED THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES HAVE BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY FOR THE PAST TWO WEEKS.

3) THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES AND THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES, BUT IT IS A QUESTION IF IT HAS ONLY BEEN A RESULT OF THE REVOLUTION. INDEED, THE VERY ACTIONS IT MUST TAKE TO MAINTAIN ITS AUTHORITY ARE ANY INITIALLY TO WORSEN THE SITUATION FOR THE PEOPLE IN THE IRANIAN POLITICAL. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FOR THE PAST PAST SEVERAL MONTHS FROM THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, SEEM TO BENEFIT SUBSTANTIALLY FROM THE DISPARATE PRESENTATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES. THEY STILL ENJOY THE LUXURY OF NOT BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR GOVERNANCE, AND THEY ARE FREE TO GIVE THEIR FULL SUPPORT TO A VARIETY OF SPECIAL INTEREST ISSUES AND DEMANDS THAT MAY WELL BE CONTRADICTORY. THEY CAN, IN ADDITION, BE EXPECTED TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO PLEASE ALL OF THE PEOPLE ALL OF THE TIME.

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 2624

1. 10/26/79; RDS-4 3/1/79 (STENPEL, J.D.) ON-P

2. 10/26/79, IP
3. IRAN'S NEW CONSTITUTION

(1.0 - NATIVE TEXT)

1. SUMMARY: MINISTER OF INFORMATION, TOURISM AND
CULTURE DR. MASSEH MINATCHI (STRICTLY PROTECT) REVIEWED
DRAFTING OF IRAN'S NEW CONSTITUTION. IRAN WILL HAVE AN
ELECTED PRESIDENT, ONE HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT AND STRONG FLEET
AND RIGHTS. END SUMMARY.

2. STENPEL AND TOMSETH CALLED ON MINISTER MINATCHI
ON 10/26/79. MINATCHI DISCUSSED VAST EXTENT OF CORR-
UPTION WHICH HAD COME TO LIGHT WHEN NEW GOVERNMENT EXAMINED
FINANCIALS REPORTED STENPEL) AND GAVE US FOLLOWING INFOR-
MATION ABOUT NEW IRANIAN CONSTITUTION:

3. CONSTITUTION WAS DRAFTED BY A COMMITTEE OF FIVE AND IS
BEING REVIEWED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND OTHER SENIOR
RELIGIOUS LEADERS. BASIC ELEMENTS OF CONSTITUTION PROVIDE
FOR A PRESIDENT, ONE HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT AND STRONG
FLEET AND RIGHTS. END SUMMARY.

OF CONFIDENCE FROM THE MAJLIS. IN THE CONSTITUTION, THE SENATE IS DEPOSED AND IRAN BECOMES A UNICAMERAL STATE.

6. MINAICHI STRESSED THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTING COMMITTEE HAD INCLUDED VIRTUALLY EVERY ARTICLE FROM THE U.N. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE COVENANTS ON POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RIGHTS. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, MINAICHI FELT THE COVENANTS' EMPHASIS ON RIGHTS WOULD NOT CONFLICT WITH THE ISLAMIC BASIS OF THE CONSTITUTION. (COMMENT: THERE WILL BE MUCH FIGHTING.) THE CONSTITUTION WILL HAVE 167 ARTICLES UNLESS CHANGED IN THE REVIEW PERIOD.

7. POLIOFF ASKED ABOUT THE APPARENT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE KHOMENI REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE. MINISTER HAZAREGAN REPLIED THIS "PARALLEL GOVERNMENT" -- (SEE REPORTED SEPTTEL.) MINAICHI SAID THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WAS DRAFTING A BILL TO ESTABLISH A REVOLUTIONARY COMMISSION. THIS WOULD BE READY SOMETIME NEXT WEEK, AT WHICH TIME THE COMMITTEES WOULD DISSOLVE THEMSELVES AND THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE WOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. (COMMENT: WE BELIEVE MINAICHI'S AND HAZAREGAN'S INTENTIONS ARE GOOD, BUT WE ARE NOT SURE THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMISSION OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT WILL ALLOW THIS PROCESS TO PROCEED SMOOTHLY AS MINAICHI BELIEVES IT WILL.)

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TAGS: POOR, PI, P.
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ISSUES: THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND THE
MILITARY

1. (C - C. TIRF TEST.)

2. SUMMARY: MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUE OVER NEXT MONTH OR SIX WEEKS IS LIKELY TO BE TYPE OF REPUBLIC IRAN WILL HAVE. LEFT IS AND MAY BE THAT IS AN ISSUE WITH WHO WILL STATE IT. NARROW ISLAMIC BASE OF REPUBLIC. SOME AYATOLLAH AND MANY ISLAMIC MOVEMENT POLITICAL ARE NOT COMFORTABLE, EITHER. QUESTION OF DISPOSITION OF ARMED FORCES AND ISLAMIC SHIP OF REVOLUTIONARY IRAQI ARMY IS SECOND MAJOR UNRESOLVED PROBLEM FACING IRAQI'S NEW RULERS AND THOSE WHO WISH TO PURSUE REVOLUTION. FURTHER, END SUMMARY.

3. OVER PAST FEW DAYS, NUMBER OF GROUPS IN IRAN HAVE COMPLAINED THAT NEW REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION PROJECTED FOR IRAN WILL BE TOO NARROWLY BASED ON ISLAMIC LAW AND NOT PROVIDE "FREEDOM" WHICH DEMOCRACY SHOULD PROVIDE. FACT THAT KHOMEINI SAID CONSTITUTION WOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC UNTIL AFTER REFERENDUM ON ISLAMIC REPUBLIC HAS DRAWN FIRE FROM MANY QUARTERS. PEOPLES' FEDAYEEN (PF), LARGEST AND MOST MILITANT COMMUNIST GROUP, HAS MADE THIS ONE OF ITS THEMES (SEE REF A), AS HAVE OTHER GROUPS. SOME SUPPORTERS OF OLD REGIME HAVE ALSO TAKEN UP THIS LINE, LEADING AYATOLLAH TALEQANI TO WARN NATION THAT THERE ARE "7 CH & THOUSAND" EX-SAVAK MEN (PRESS NEXT DAY ADDED "AND CIA") AGENTS READY TO SUBVERT REVOLUTION.

4. EMBOFFS' CONTACTS OVER PAST FEW DAYS HAVE ALSO UNCOVERED SUBSTANTIAL UNEASINESS AMONG MODERNIZED IRANIANS WHO HAVE SUPPORTED ISLAMIC REVOLUTION (REF B), BUT WHO UNTIL RECENTLY DID NOT BELIEVE IN THEIR HEARTS THAT KHOMEINI WOULD GO BACK TO STRICT MOSLEM ORTHODOXY. NOW THEY FEAR HE MAY DO SO.

5. PARTICULARLY POIGNANT ARE CASES OF MODERATE POLITICAL LEADERS IN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, SUCH AS BAZARGAN AND HIS IMMEDIATE DEPUTIES, WHO HAVE BEEN TELLING EMOFFS FOR MONTHS THAT "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC" WOULD REALLY LOOK A LOT LIKE A MODERN WESTERN DEMOCRACY. EVEN MODERATE AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI WENT ON PUBLIC RECORD MARCH 2 WITH STATEMENT SAYING THAT "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC WOULD NOT BE 1,000 YEAR THROWBACK. PROBLEM IS COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT REGIME IS HAVING TO DEFEND ITS ISLAMIC BASE FROM LEFTIST ATTACKS WHILE AT SAME TIME TRYING TO mollify traditional clergy and others. THIS IS CLEARLY CURRENT YIN YANG OF PROBLEM. KHOMEINI AND BAZARGAN FACE AN IRONIC SITUATION IN WHICH POLITICAL SYSTEM ON SUCH A RECENTLY

WHETHER CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC AFTER REVIEW BY
BASIC ELEMENTS OF DRAFT CONSTITUTION PROVIDED REF. DO
SOURCES INDICATE CONSTITUTION WILL BE AT LEAST
IF NOT FULLY REVEALED, AND THAT THE MAJORITY
WILL COME AT THE TIME OF ELECTIONS
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WHICH MUST REVIEW AND APPROVE IT.

MOVE TO ISLAMIC REPUBLIC HAS BEEN APPROVED IN
PRINCIPLE (EVEN FEDAYEEN HAVE GONE ON RECORD AS SUPPORTING
YES VOTE TO DISPOSE OF MONARCHY), GOV. WILL FACE SAME PROBLEM
VICTORIOUS ISLAMIC FORCES FACED AFTER 11-12 "VICTORY" OVER
OLD GOVERNMENT, NOW TO KEEP REVOLUTIONARY COALITION TOGETHER
EVERY SMALLER GROUP WHICH HAS ITS OWN IDEAS FOR CONSTITUTION
OF IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE WILL BE PAINFULLY OBVIOUS TO ALL
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ENTEZAM SAYS STEADFASTLY THAT ISLAMIC
MOVEMENT WILL HAVE "OVERWHELMING" MAJORITY OF DELEGATES
(MININFO MINATCHI ESTIMATES 85-90 PERCENT), BUT DOES NOT DO
SO WITH SAME FIRM CONVICTION HE HAD A WEEK AGO. CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTION WILL CLEARLY REMAIN FOCUS OF POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS FOR
FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

7. SECOND MAJOR POLITICAL STRUGGLE UNDERWAY CONCERNS FUTURE OF
ARMED FORCES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
NOW BEING FORMED UNDER DIRECTION OF DEPUTY PM YAZDI. RADICALS IN
BOTH FEDAYEEN AND MUJAHIDIN CAMPS SEE REVOLUTIONARY GUARD
AS MAJOR ARMED FORCE AND ONLY WAY TO INSURE PURITY OF REVOLUTION.
EVEN YAZDI HIMSELF DOES NOT AGREE WITH THIS, AND MANY OTHER
POLITICIANS, INCLUDING EX-MILITARY MEN, SEE REVITALIZED ARMED
FORCES AS NECESSARY FOR SECURITY OF REVOLUTION AS WELL AS
NATION. CURRENT DIALOGUE CENTERS AROUND HOW DEEP PURGES
SHOULD GO IN ARMY, AND HOW ARMED FORCES CAN BE RECONSTITUTED
ON REVOLUTIONARY BASE IF OFFICERS OF FORMER REGIME ARE USED.
RESULT TO DATE HAS BEEN SMOOTHING OF SIGHT TOP MILITARY MEN,
AND RETIREMENTS OF ALL THREE AND FOUR STAR GENERALS, PLUS ARRESTS
OF OTHERS DOWN TO LEVEL OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL ON A CASE-BY-CASE
BASIS. RAPID TURNOVER IN TOP COMMAND JOBS IN AIR FORCE, PLUS
LACK OF NEW TOP ARMY TROOPS IN GROUND SERVICES, PLUS INCIDENCE
OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE IN SELECTING THEM. SOME OFFICERS WERE
FORCED NEW GOV TO GO ON SLOWLY THAN IT WOULD WISH. IT
WAS ALSO HAD COINCIDENTAL EFFECT OF POLITICAL GOV DECISION
OF SCOPE OF FUTURE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE, IF ANY, SINCE
THOSE PRESENT U.S. COMPLAINING OFFICERS ARE DOING SO AT LEAST IN
PART BECAUSE THEY ARE TO LOSE ONE STRONG PERSONAL U.S.
INFLUENCE IN AREA (GOV'S AS YAZDI HAS DONE AND IS GOING ON TO
DO OTHERS).

8. STRUGGLE WITHIN AND ABOUT MILITARY LEADS THAT QUESTION
OF AUTHORITY AND USE OF FORCE (CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICE AND
SPECIFICALLY THIS ARGUMENT, BUT NO A LARGER ONE) WILL
BE KEPT ALIVE LONGER THAN GOV WOULD LIKE. SURELY, AT LEAST
FOR SOME TIME, IS LIKELY TO BE CONTAINING A SERIOUS SECURITY
SITUATION WITHIN IRAN. SULLIVAN

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SOME SEVERAL MONTHS AFTER MY ARRIVAL IN SHIRAZ I RECEIVED
MY "INITIAL IMPRESSIONS OF IRAN" (CREATED) WHICH WERE
PESIMISTIC ABOUT IRAN'S FUTURE. SHORTLY THEREAFTER
HAD A DISCUSSION OF IRAN'S FUTURE WITH AN
OFFICIAL WHO HAD BEEN IN IRAN FOR SEVERAL
YEARS. HE SAID THAT IRAN WAS A COUNTRY
OF GREAT POTENTIAL. HE MENTIONED THAT THE
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS IN THE PROCESS OF
OFFICIAL THEORIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NATION. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS
SERVING IN THE PROVINCES; THAT I SAW AN
VALUE OF IMPORTS EXCEEDING THE VALUE OF EXPORTS (FROM
OIL) BY MORE THAN 10 TIMES; THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS
CARRYING OUT IRANIAN CROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND
INCOME; THAT I WORRIED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF A GOVERNMENT
SO DEPENDENT ON A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL AND THE ACTIVITY
AND EFFICIENCY OF THE SINGLE OFFICIAL. POLITICAL
HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE IRANIAN EFFORTS TO DEVELOP
POLITICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE EDUCATION
HE WAS PROBABLY THE ONLY PRINCE WHO WOULD HAVE THE
RELATIVELY EASY TRANSITION OF POWER AT A SUFFICIENT
FAR REMOVED FROM THE IRANIAN IN THE END. HE
IRANIAN AFFAIRS THAN WE WERE AS TO WHETHER THE
IRANIAN CLASS WAS FULL OF ENERGY. THAT MAY HAVE BEEN TRUE, BUT
THE IMPORTANT POINT WAS NOT WHERE WE WERE BUT WHERE WE
WERE BUT RATHER WHERE IRAN DID NOT YET RECOGNIZE THE ATTRIBUTES
WAS TO CONFORM TO THE PREMISES ABOUT IRAN UPON WHICH OUR
POLICY OBJECTIVES WERE BUILT. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT
HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED WAS FAR LESS RELEVANT THAN WHAT REMAINED
TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. HAD WE BEEN ABLE TO FOCUS MORE ATTENTION
ON CONTINUING IRANIAN DEFICIENCIES THAN WE IN FACT DID,
THE GOVERNMENT IN PLACE OF THE PARLAMENT POLITICAL SYSTEM
WAS IN A POSITION TO SHOW TO US

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LIVING. INDEED, THEIR COEXISTENCE IN IRANIAN SOCIETY
 IS A LATENT TENSION THAT CAN EXPLODE IN THE KIND OF
 CRISIS WITNESSED DURING THE LAST YEAR. AS IT WAS PERCEIVED
 THAT THE SHAH WAS NOT ADHERING TO HIS OWN MAXIM, I.E. N
 TO PEOPLE ARE CONDUCTING HIMSELF LIKE THE KING OF SWEDEN,
 FATALISTIC ACCEPTANCE OF HIS RULE WAS INCREASINGLY
 SUBSTITUTED BY CHALLENGE TO IT. THE DEGREE OF PERSONALIZATION
 OF THIS CHALLENGE, AS EVIDENCED BY THE BITTERNESS OF THE
 REPROACHES OF SHAH HIMSELF, REFLECTED ITS ECOLOGICAL CORE,
 HOWEVER, AND THE APPARENT UNITY OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE IS NOT
 IN PROPORTIONALLY SPHERICAL AS THE CHALLENGE TO THE PAHLAVI
 IS NOT IS TRANSFORMED INTO A SET OF INDIVIDUAL WILLS
 THE PAHLAVI. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT THE SHAH'S
 POSITION WILL BE WEAKENED BY ANY FORM OF
 REPROACH, NOT ONLY FOR HIM, BUT FOR THE ENTIRE NATION. SUCH AN
 REPROACH, IN THE WILL BE PERCEIVED AS A CHALLENGE TO THE
 ENTIRE NATION. THE CHALLENGE TO THE PAHLAVI IS NOT ONLY OF THE
 NATION, BUT ALSO OF THE ENTIRE NATION. THE CHALLENGE TO THE
 PAHLAVI IS NOT ONLY OF THE NATION, BUT ALSO OF THE ENTIRE NATION.

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QUOTE: "THEY WILL BE POWERFUL INCENTIVES FOR ANY GOVERNMENT IN THE AREA TO SELL TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER. THAT SHOULD INCLUDE WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN AT LEAST THE OPPORTUNITY TO SELL TO CHINA. SIMILARLY, IRAN SHOULD REMAIN NO LESS COMMITTED TO THE SHAN TO KEEP THE SUPPLY OF OIL OPEN. IRAN'S ABILITY TO ACT AS THE CENTRE OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAS ALWAYS QUESTIONABLE, BUT THAT IT WOULD BE A CENTRE OF GRAVITY DOES PROSESS TO BE A FACT WITHIN THE INTERESTS WHICH IT HAS. THE OIL OF THE PERSIAN GULF IS NOT ONLY THE OIL OF THE OTHER PRODUCING STATES OF THE

GULF, THE PRIMARY CONSUMING COUNTRIES AND OURSELVES. CANNOT BE DOUBTED. QUOTE MORROW: "IT IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE THAT IRAN WILL BE ABLE TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH NO, PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF THE SOPHISTICATED TECHNOLOGY IT MUST HAVE IN THE OIL THAT IS LIKELY TO BE USED FOR THE FUTURE. ITS ONLY SIGNIFICANT SOURCE OF FUTURE OIL FLOWING IN THE CASE OF A SHORTAGE OF OIL IS THAT THE MASSIVE GAP BETWEEN IRAN'S PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION WILL BE FILLING ONLY IF AT ALL SUFFICIENT FOR THE FUTURE FOR ACCESS TO AMERICAN SOURCES OF SUPPLY WILL BE SUFFICIENT. THE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF IRAN ARE ALSO TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. IRAN WILL NOT FALL INTO THE HANDS OF THE WESTERN WORLD."

THESE SUBJECTS ARE: 1. THE
INFLUENCE OF THE STATE ON THE
ECONOMY. 2. THE INFLUENCE OF THE
ECONOMY ON THE STATE. 3. THE
INFLUENCE OF THE STATE ON THE
CULTURE. 4. THE INFLUENCE OF THE
CULTURE ON THE STATE. 5. THE
INFLUENCE OF THE STATE ON THE
POLITICS. 6. THE INFLUENCE OF THE
POLITICS ON THE STATE. 7. THE
INFLUENCE OF THE STATE ON THE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 2747

E.O. 12865: GDS-4 3/6/99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OP-P
TACS: ROOM PINS-IR
SUBJ: IRAN'S NEW CONSTITUTION: THE ARGUMENTS

REF: A. TEHRAN 2681, E. TEHRAN 2624

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: SECULARISTS HAVE ATTACKED CONCEPT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. GROUP HAS BEEN FORMED TO ARGUE FOR "DEMOCRATIC" RATHER THAN "ISLAMIC" REPUBLIC. PUBLIC DEBATE OVER CON-
TENTS OF CONSTITUTION. END SUMMARY.

3. WEEK OF DEBATE ON QUESTION OF REFERRING LAW OF IRAN'S NEW CONSTITUTION CAME TO A HEAD MARCH 5 WHEN SECULAR FORCES CELEBRATING ANNIVERSARY OF DEATH OF EX-PRIME MINISTER MOHAMMAD MOSSADEQ FORMED NEW "NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT" IN BREAKAWAY MOVE FROM NATIONAL FRONT. NEW GROUPING WAS ANNOUNCED BY PROMINENT LAWYER AYATOLLAH KATIN-DAFTARY, A MOSSADEQ GRANDSON WHO IS NOW ACTIVE IN PROGRESSIVE BAR ASSOCIATION. GROUP CALLED FOR LUPICIDE TO END MONARCHY, BUT SAID DETERMINATION OF TYPE OF REGIME SHOULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL PEOPLE HAD DEBATED THE ISSUE ADEQUATELY. KATIN-DAFTARY ATTACKED NATIONAL FRONT FOR ITS DEVIATING FROM DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND ITS ATTACHMENT TO THEOCRATIC RATHER THAN DEMOCRATIC IDEAS.

4. ARGUMENT OVER CONSTITUTION BEGAN SEVERAL DAYS AGO WITH BAZARGAN ANNOUNCEMENT THAT REFERENDUM WOULD BE HELD MARCH 30 TO VOTE ON QUESTION OF DISBANDING MONARCHY AND ACCEPTING ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. CONSTITUTION DRAFTERS PASSED THEIR WORK TO AYATOLLAH KHOMENI, WHO SAID IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT CONSTITUTION WOULD NOT BE FINAL BEFORE REFERENDUM. NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS AND ARTISTS ORGANIZED GROUPS, INCLUDING RADICAL LEFT (GDS 4), ATTACKED IRAN'S ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AS EXTRANEAL AND DISGRACEFUL. ILLUSTRATION WAS SERIES OF ARTICLES BY PROMINENT, GIFTED WRITER BUT LIGHTWEIGHT IN BUILDING WHO SHOWN NOSE FOR DETECTING WHICH WAY WIND OF REVOLUTION. AYATOLLAH LAID DOWN CHALLENGE: TAGHAYAT OF TAGHAYAT AND REVIEWED HISTORY OF OTHER REVOLUTIONS--SPANISH, PORTUGUESE, GREEK--STRESSING DEMOCRATIC THEMES AS COUNTERPOINT TO PRONOUNCEMENTS OF AYATOLLAH KHOMENI MARCH 1 UPON ARRIVING AT DOM WHICH CALLED FOR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC.

OTHER... LINE
... ON 20 00 00 00 00
... DEMOCRATIC...
... MEANING OF ISLAM.

... THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEMSELVES
... REPUBLIC WOULD BE BORN
... SHARIAT-MADANI CRITICIZED SENIOR
... FOR RIDICULING ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
... AND ISLAMIC REPUBLIC WOULD BE
... DEMOCRATIC. IN EARLIER TALK, SHARIAT-
... ISLAMIC CONCEPT OF JUSTICE, ISLAMIC
... REPUBLIC WOULD BE DEMOCRATIC. HIS ARGUMENTS HARDLY
... HOWEVER, WHO HAVE WATCHED WITH
... OF THE FAMILY PROTECTION ACT,
... OF EDUCATION, BANNING OF
... AND WARNINGS THAT THE PRESS HAD
... THE ISLAMIC LINE.

OUTCOME OF THIS ARGUMENT OVER IRAN'S PROJECTED
... IS NOT LIKELY TO BE RESOLVED IN SHORT ORDER.
... DEBATE AND FORMATION OF NATIONAL
... WITH WHICH ISLAMIC
... DRAFT CONSTITUTION (SOME DETAILS GIVEN SEP 8) IS MADE
... CENTER OF CONCRETE ARGUMENTS. WHILE
... A REASONABLE ISLAMIC CONSTI-
... BACKFIRE AGAINST IT TO DATE
... IN POST-REFERENDUM CONSTITUTIONAL
... TRY TO AMEND IT ALONG MORE SECULAR
... NOW BEING PUT FORTH MIGHT THUS BE
... SALVUS IN STRUGGLE CENTERING ON CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY.

SULL IVAN

CG RUENQ RUHNA
DL RUOMNR #2785 067055Z
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O 080950Z MAR 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
INFO RUHNC/STATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

DE C R T TEHRAN (2785)

URGENT

DEPT PASS ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE

P.O. 12065: OPS 3/5/79 (12065, 12065, 12065)
TAGS: NATO, PARM, IR
SUBJ: IRANIAN ASSESS

REF: STATE 056452

REFUTED CONTRARY TO THE ASS. SS. THE
FIND LITTLE CAUSE FOR EVEN MODERATE OPTIMISM IN THE
PRESENT IRANIAN SITUATION. ALL THE WEAKNESS IN THE
POSITION-ENLIGHTENED IN RECENTLY VALID, BUT THE FACTORS
LISTED IN HIS FAVOR GROWING STRENGTH THAT SIMPLY DOES NOT MEET.

2. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE MANY IRANIANS ARE INDEED ANXIOUS FOR
AND ON TO THE TURMOIL WHICH HAS GRIPPED IRAN, THEY ARE RAPIDLY
CONVICTED TO BRING IT AHEAD. EVENTS HAVE MOVED BEYOND THE
OF ANY INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP AND ARE NOW PROCEEDING UNDER A
MOTION OF THEIR OWN TOWARD A DEVELOPMENT THAT MAY BE
THEY ENVISION OF THE FUTURE.

3. FURTHER, THERE APPEARS TO BE A GROWING RIFT BETWEEN
KHOUMENI, WHO HAS BEEN BECOMING INCREASINGLY INTRANSIGENT IN HIS
FOR A COMPLETE PURGE OF FOREIGN INFLUENCES FROM IRANIAN SO-
CIETY AND ITS TOTAL ISLAMICIZATION, AND BAZARGAN, WHO IS ATTEMPTING
IN (ALTHOUGH IN EFFECTUALLY) TO BE ALL THING TO ALL IRANIANS.
REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES, RESPONSIVE TO KHOUMENI AND NOT TO
THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, CONTINUE TO DO THAT
A LAW UNTO THEMSELVES, AND THEIR ACTIONS ARE IN COMPLETE
CROSS-PURPOSES WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT
ASSET IT AUTHORITY.

THESE LIMITATIONS DO NOT PREVENT ANYONE FROM REPORTING ANY AND ALL INFORMATION TO THE FACT THAT

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CHARTER: VLTomseth
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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

IMMEDIATE RUEHL

INFO:

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 006-007 RUQMBI
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 004-005 RUQMGH
USINT BAGHDAD 005-006 RUEHLR
AMEMBASSY BONN 0012-0013 - RUFHOL
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 004-005 RUEHEG
AMCONSUL DHARAN 001-002 RUQMAN
AMEMBASSY DOHA 001-002 RUQMOD
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 50-51 RUHFHT
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 009-010 RUSSAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 002-003 RUQMAA
AMEMBASSY KABUL 001-007 RUSSBK
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 001-002 RUQMKM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 001-002 RUQMKW
AMEMBASSY LONDON 001-009 RUOTC
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 001-010 RUQMAM
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 001-010 RUEHMO
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 004-005 RUQMMT
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 004-005 RUSSAE
AMEMBASSY PARIS 011-012 RUFNPS
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 001-002 RUHSPG
AMEMBASSY RABAT 003-004 RUOKBT
USLO RIYADH 002-003 RUQMYA
AMEMBASSY ROME 003-005 RUFHRO
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 002-003 RUENKO
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE RUSSNAA
UNCINCPAC RUHQHQA
USCOCOSOUTH RUFRSHH

TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PINS, IR

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/17/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P

SUBJECT: The Bazargan Government One Month Later and
Prospects for the Future

1. C - entire text.

2. Summary: The Bazargan Government, after one month in office, remains extremely ineffectual. The unexpected suddenness with which it came to power, lack of a policy on how to employ the former regime's bureaucrats, police and military officers, collapse of the military and law enforcement agencies, and Khomeini's tendency to undercut

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Bazargan are among the factors which explain this continued weakness. We doubt that Bazargan--as distinct from the larger Islamic revolutionary movement--will be able to assert his government's authority or to see its program through to successful completion. Rather, it seems more likely that the coming months will be dominated by potential contenders for power preparing themselves for the possibility of eventual armed confrontation.

End Summary.

3. A month after displacing the last government appointed by the Shah, the Provisional Government of Mehdi Bazargan remains exceedingly ineffectual. During its time in office it has accomplished almost nothing, not even establishment of an undisputed claim to primacy in administering the nation's affairs. More often than not, it is the revolutionary committees--which despite repeated announcements that they are to be integrated with existing government agencies, continue to thrive as independent power centers--that actually govern, at least in matters of local concern. The power of this parallel system of government has been especially evident in the areas of law enforcement and administration of justice, areas where the Provisional Government has been shown impotent and acutely embarrassed time and again by arbitrary arrests, summary trials and ^{9/13/4} ~~summary~~ executions carried out by the committees without regard to the government's jurisdictional responsibilities.

4. There are several factors involved in the Provisional

Government's continuing inability to function effectively. The first relates to the unexpectedness with which the Bakhtiar government fell. Despite brave pronouncements from the Khomeini camp even before the Ayatollah's return to Iran that an administrative structure had been created and was ready to replace the Pahlavi regime, it is clear that Bazargan was almost totally unprepared to assume command of the government apparatus^a when he did. Second, there has been considerable vacillation regarding whether or not to utilize fully the existing civilian, law enforcement, and military structures. Bazargan is caught on the horns of a dilemma here: Many senior bureaucrats, police and military officers are assumed to be tainted by virtue of their collaboration with the Pahlavi regime, but often they are the only ones with the expertise needed to do certain jobs. The Provisional Government's uncertainty in how to handle this matter frequently results in no policy at all. In the absence of a clearly defined position, the committees have been left free to deal with these individuals as they see fit. Needless to say, committee members have not hesitated to settle old scores. Third, the disintegration of law enforcement agencies and the military has left the Provisional Government with no means to bring force to bear when its authority is challenged--as it regularly is.

5. The biggest handicap of all, however, is the role of

Ayatollah Khomeini. Prior to the collapse of the Pahlavi regime, among Khomeini's strengths as leader of the opposition were his penchant for speaking in generalities and, beyond a vague insistence on returning to the political ideals of the Prophet and the Imams, his apparent lack of any well-thought-out philosophy of government. Accordingly, his pronouncements were open to a wide variety of interpretations. As the almost universally recognized leader of the Iranian revolution, Khomeini still has to be listened to, but these days his frequently Delphic utterances delivered *ad libitum* no longer mean all things to all people. Rather, they are a source of considerable confusion and, ultimately, administrative paralysis as the Provisional Government is forced to spend an inordinate amount of time putting out fires started by Khomeini's off-the-cuff remarks on subjects as diverse as frozen meat and the wearing of the veil.

6. . We doubt that Bazargan will be able to overcome the obstacles before him. It is extremely unlikely that Khomeini will refrain from making the kind of statements that have badly undercut the Provisional Government to date. One source close to the Ayatollah has mentioned efforts to provide him with better counsel in the hope that it will reduce the number of ill-advised statements he makes, but Khomeini does not seem the sort to hold his tongue for considerations of practical politics. Rather, his percepti-

of himself as the chosen messenger of God in the Iranian revolution carries with it a responsibility to speak out on matters of divine concern. Nor does Bazargan have much prospect of being able to revitalize law enforcement agencies and the armed forces, organizations which otherwise might be able to put some teeth into his government's mandate to rule. The revolutionary committee structure, which for the moment commands an overwhelming preponderance of firepower, has already demonstrated it will resist all efforts to curb its present prerogatives. Moreover, according to the same source with connections to Khomeini mentioned above, Khomeini prefers that the committees continue in existence.

7. Under the circumstances, it will be most difficult for the Provisional Government to see its main tasks--a referendum on the type of government Iranians want for themselves, election of a constituent assembly to debate and adopt a new constitution, and election of a majles and formation of a new government under the terms of that constitution--through to successful completion. Already, a controversy over the format of the referendum has arisen, and indeed there are growing doubts that the Provisional Government can even solve the logistics problems involved in holding the ballot before the date it is presently scheduled for--March 30th. In the meantime, economic problems accumulate, unemployment grows, ethnic minorities

grumble, and the revolutionary committees do their own thing. That a political program such as that set out for itself by the Provisional Government will be possible in the midst of such conditions stretches credulity to the breaking point.

8. More likely, we believe, will be efforts by those forces contending for power to develop the coercive wherewithal to prevail in a struggle in which armed strength almost certainly will determine the final outcome. This seems to be what is behind Deputy PM Yazdi's program to create a paramilitary National Guard responsive to him. Yazdi, the only member of the Provisional Government who also holds a seat on the shadowy Central Revolutionary Committee, appears to be in a relatively strong position to bid ultimately for power. His major point of vulnerability is his "American connection," something potential rivals have already indicated a willingness to exploit. The Islamic mojahedin-e-khalq and the Marxist fedayin-e-khalq organizations, both now well-armed, are certainly contenders. The various local revolutionary committees themselves seem too fragmented and their leadership too preoccupied with carving out petty fiefdoms to become a serious alternative to the Provisional Government as a national government. Perhaps some provincial committees, however, in places like Shiraz (where the local committee has a significant military component and local military units survived the revolution

virtually intact) may possess such potential. Ethnic minorities, such as the Kurds, could well become influential by throwing their support to one contender for national power or another, although we doubt that any group alone could be a serious challenger by itself.

9. In sum, the coming months are likely to see continuing paralysis at the center while those groups which are apt to become the real contenders for power organize and consolidate their positions in anticipation of what could easily become a bloody struggle for predominance.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: M, a Tabriz Businessman
Michael J. Metrisko, Poloff, Amembassy Tehran *ry*

DATE: March 17 and 18, 1979

PLACE: Tehran

SUBJECT: The Revolutionary Backlash

Note: M is in his early twenties and presently is the manager of one of his family's stores in Tabriz. (His father was, prior to his death, a well-known industrialist/merchant, with import/export activities, a large factory, village lands and other investment properties.) Throughout the past year, M has been heavily involved, both because of family ties and through his own inclination, in the "revolution" in the Azarbaijan. M has spent short periods in the Tabriz SAVAK jail for political reasons, and his credentials as a revolutionary, both because of his prison past and his family ties (his uncle is one of the leading revolutionary financiers in Tabriz), are excellent. In all of our conversations last winter, M was adamantly anti-Shah and pro-Khomeini, and he himself played an active street role in the continuous demonstrations against the Pahlavi regime.

M's present view of the revolution has changed considerably, and instead of continuing with what might have been a promising role as a "revolutionary", he has now withdrawn from almost all of his political activities in Tabriz. During two long conversations this week, he expressed his dissatisfaction at the way events have turned out.

One of his main reasons for withdrawing from active participation in the post-revolutionary process in Tabriz was displeasure over the forthcoming referendum, which will limit popular choice of the new form of government to an Islamic Republic or, in M's view, "nothing". He did not fight and demonstrate all year because he wanted to be ruled by mullahs, he said, but because he really believed that he could help in bringing a democratic form of government to Iran. The "Islamic Democracy" so bruited in the newspapers and being urged by so many clerics is the antithesis of what he worked for, and not any better for Iran than the Pahlavi regime was.

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Another reason for M's discontent is the fact that so many "unacceptable" types have now jumped on the revolutionary bandwagon, and are already shunting aside the people who made real sacrifices for the revolution. As an example, M mentioned going on local Committee business to another of the Committee groups and finding his former SAVAK interrogator (and M claims his former "torturer") busily employed as one of the chief Committee interrogators. M claims that he is fully in favor of making use of SAVAK expertise in the new government, since the trained personnel once employed by SAVAK should not be wasted, but seeing the person who beat him in a SAVAK jail now a respectable Committee member was just a bit too much.

Age and background of the new power group also upset M, who claims that many of the Tabriz Committee people are simply old bazaar merchants who have no ability and less common sense, mullahs who are backward, fanatic, incompetent and interested only in accumulating personal power, or very young "toughs" who are using their recently obtained weapons to continue indulging in terrorizing and robbing people.

At the same time, a complex jockeying for position and participation is going on among the very people who were part and parcel of the old power structure. M is seeing himself and his own "revolutionary" friends shoved aside by others who are far more expert in demagoguery and Byzantine bureaucratic procedure.

COMMENT: M's pessimism and withdrawal from political activity on the local Tabriz scene may be representative of what others of his age and social group are doing. As a young, well-to-do liberal, M was adamantly opposed to the Pahlavi regime, but his liberal (and youthful) fervor simply cannot take the realities of factional infighting. Too much of an idealist, he somehow believed that once the Shah left, logic and democratic good intentions would rule the day, and that he and all of Iran could bask in a free and secure world. The view of the future that he and others of his friends debated in their comfortable pre-revolution living rooms did not take into account the fact that for thousands of others the revolution might turn into a vehicle for personal ambition. Very much a product of the upper provincial class, M could also not foresee a time when "riffraff" with guns might be giving him orders or threatening his life-style. M now realizes that the changes in Iran may not have been beneficial to himself and others like him, and he is demonstrating a Persian cynicism towards politics and participation that he had always condemned in others before.

The reasons M gave for his present dissatisfaction are recurrent themes in conversations I've had with many other Iranians, and represent a backlash against the form now taken by the revolutionary movement.

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Iranians are a very class conscious people, with a language and traditional etiquette strictly geared to a definite knowledge of one's position in the social/economic structure. Many a Persian official or bourgeois merchant who supported the overthrow of the Shah is now appalled to learn that his own status is threatened by the breakup in the royal hierarchy, and it can be amusing (in a black-humor way) to watch a well-dressed, middle class Iranian trying to deal with a GS-3 toting 19-year old "revolutionary". For reasons, or delusions, of their own, many of the "anti-Shah" middle class never seemed to imagine that their own security or positions could be affected by the revolution, and their discontent over the effects on their own life style is becoming more and more vocal. The "liberal" parlor revolutionary has finally realized that his calls for "Khomeini" have unleashed Islamic religious and moral forces with which the caller is not prepared to cope.

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ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 449

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/20/85 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P

TAGS: PGOV, IR

SUBJECT: March 30th Referendum

1. C - entire text.
2. During meeting with Prime Minister March 19, Ambassador asked if timing and form of forthcoming referendum will remain as advertised, ~~as change~~. Bazargan replied affirmatively ~~to both questions~~ but noted he himself is not involved in preparations for the referendum. They are being handled by Interior Minister with the assistance of a special commission. He implied that he could not be absolutely categoric but believed the referendum would go through on March 30th with a single question to which voters would be asked to reply Yes or No.
3. Bazargan agreed there were many people sniping at the format of the referendum, but he said as far as he knew referenda are always Yes or No propositions to a single question. He hoped to explain all this to the critics and reduce the political controversy on the question.

SULLIVAN

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METRINKO CHRON

Tehran

March 20, 1979

SECRET

Mr. Henry Precht
NSA/IRN
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Precht:

I assume the two attached "Memos to the Files" will cast even more shadow on recent events in Iran.

The general chronology started out as a journal I began to keep in Tabriz, but things were moving so swiftly and so chaotically that it falls far short of a detailed description. Then, too, several of the pages were lost when the Air Force/Committee group trashed the building. I've done my best to leave out (and forget) the emotions I felt during the several-day period, but the story is otherwise "how it happened".

The MenCon came about later, when one of my Tabriz friends paid a two-day visit to Tehran. I offer it without any more comment, except to say that I most definitely trust his intelligence and honesty. As more and more of my Tabriz friends show up to see me here in Tehran, I expect that other pieces will fall together... I am just not quite certain whether I really want them to, since there is indeed great comfort in ignorance.

Sincerely,

Michael J. Metrinko

Attachments 2

SECRET

DATE: March 19, 1979

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memorandum

REPLY TO
ATTN OF:Michael J. Metrinko
American Embassy Tehran

SUBJECT:

The Attack on the American Consulate Tabriz

TO:

THE FILES

NOTE: The following is taken partly from a journal I was attempting to start during the final days of the Bakhtiar government, and partly from my recollection of events after the attack on the Consulate.

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GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
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TABRIZ, IRAN
FEBRUARY 11, 1979

The way things are going there won't be a city of Tabriz for me to be Consul in much longer. The fighting here has been continuous since yesterday evening, which means that all one can hear outside is shooting with occasional shouting and the sounds of people running. The tanks add an off-and-on break to what have become normal sounds, but despite my aural adaptation to the war in the city, 24 hours without a break is enough even for me. The city is also on fire again, which is somewhat surprising, since there really didn't seem to be much left to burn after the last time--was that a few days ago or a few weeks ago? I can't remember any more.

When I went outside to the back garden about half an hour ago, I counted six large fires. From where I'm sitting now, looking out towards the front of the Consulate, it's all a haze of smoke. Needless to say, the people here are not in the best of psychological moods--the last person to call (about half an hour ago) burst into tears on the phone and hung up. I'm okay at the moment, since there are about thirty soldiers around the building, but it is not clear how long they will be staying.

In Tehran the Army has turned on the Air Force and they're busy killing each other. It's not what one would call a great time to be wearing a uniform of any kind, and I'd understand perfectly if they all just tossed their uniforms away and took off to find their own families. When that foreseeable event occurs, you had better believe I won't stick around with any grand ideas of having my name in marble in the State Department lobby.

Yesterday the local commander came to the house, and over a very proper cup of tea (he doesn't drink because of ulcers) told me to start wearing my revolver again, since he couldn't guarantee anything. My knowledge of weapons in general and my revolver in particular doesn't extend to knowing how to use them or it, so I demurred. One of these days I guess I'll have to shoot the damn

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thing if only to see where the bullets come out, but I'd rather take my chances with just running. Hopefully it won't come to that, since running was never my best sport.

In the meantime, while the above-described crap is going on all around us, some of my workers made the mistake of coming to the Consulate today, so I had them hang up our new lighting fixtures in the main lobby. If they're going to get smashed, I might as well enjoy them for a few days first.

A DAY OR SO LATER...

I have no idea what today is, and there's no one to ask. Not that it would make much difference, since Iran and Tabriz are in such a state that knowing the time would be of absolutely no importance. Yesterday several thousand people came to the Consulate and demanded that the U.S. emblem over the main gate (weighing approximately one ton) be taken down, then when that little job was completed (it was ripped down by a crowd of workers who have undoubtedly done other jobs of such type, since they were quite professional about it), they demanded that the seal over the main door to the office be removed. That was also complied with. Then they demanded that the Consul be given to them. The soldiers here finally refused. Needless to say, my regret at losing the two emblems was assuaged by not being given to the crowd myself.

The soldiers here (about thirty) were ordered away early this morning by the local general, who has gone over to the new Khomeini Government, and their commander would have scurried away without a word, except that a group of the soldiers with whom I'd become friends refused to follow his orders until I was safe and had collected my household effects and office papers. It became a real shouting match between the commander and the soldiers, and finally some of them put me in a jeep and we went off to the base to locate the general in charge. I think the general was as much influenced by the fervor of the soldiers with me as anything else (needless to say they were mostly Kurds), and he told them they could stay until I was packed up.

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We came back to the Consulate through a fairly wild scene. The city is in a terrible state after so many days of street-to-street fighting, and revenge/vendetta time is upon us. Two ex-government officials here were lynched from a tree on the main street this morning and others were busy getting their homes burned. By the time I had everything packed, "soldiers" from the Tabriz committee (i.e., fairly young civilians with policeman pretensions) had arrived.

The Consulate has been placed under religious seal as a place not to be looted or burned, which is something I would love to see discussed in the Protocol Office. Frustrated looters and loiterers have been coming up to the main gate ever since, reading the proclamation and wandering away, presumably to return some other day. In the meantime, various of my friends here are busily bargaining for my welfare, and perhaps other more important things to me, and in a few minutes I am supposed to call the committee of clergymen in the city to see what has been decided.

Nowhere in the FAM is such a telephone call described: "Hello, this is the American Consul. Sorry to bother you, but I was just wondering if you've decided that I'm an enemy of the people, or if you'd prefer that I reopen the Consulate and try to straighten out the affairs of the several thousand Tabrizis who would like to depart temporarily to soothe their nerves in Las Vegas." I am not looking forward to the call, and wish I were presently in Las Vegas or Disneyland myself.

(Note: The above was taken from a daily record of events I had started to keep, but all of the preceding and subsequent pages were lost when the Consulate was trashed.

Looking back, I realize that the events described must have taken place on February 13, because the "Islamic Guards" had just been on the compound a few hours when it was announced on television that the city prison was on fire and emergency volunteers were necessary to "save the lives of the prisoners."

There were four Americans in the prison whom I had been visiting since early in the summer (John Burchill, Pat Tiaht, Leroy Collier and Tom Smith) and with horrible

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visions in my mind, I grabbed a jacket and was heading out the main gate when a car pulled up and two of them stepped out. The two Amcits, still dressed in prison pajamas, were accompanied by two West German ex-prisoners. They assured me the other two Americans (along with an Australian and an Austrian) would be along shortly. As it turned out, they telephoned later and showed up the next day with a "committee" member in whose house they had stayed. Persian bureaucracy being what it was, I was asked to sign and seal a "receipt" for all eight of them.

The prisoners had had a terrible experience during the combined fire attack from without and revolt from within the prison, and after several hours of gunfighting and general chaos, had finally made their way outside the walls. Needless to say, there were lots of the city's people outside waiting to help them. Their arrival at the Consulate, however, coincided with a tremendous surge in street fighting, and rather than in a comfortable house with beds, they soon found themselves sleeping on the floor in the cellar--the bedrooms were simply all too exposed to the firing.

By the second night of their stay the city was in a state of open warfare. The Army/ex-martial law commander of Tabriz, General Bidabadi, had formally accepted the Bazargan regime, but after two or three days of general citywide chaos, a mob had overrun the base and emptied the armory, so that several thousand guns fell into the hands of an emotional populace.

If chaos can be measured, it reached its worst point after the dissolution of the Army troops. In the evening of the day the base fell, we did a one minute count of shots fired: Forty-seven shots in a sixty second period, and as it turned out, that was a relatively normal minute in the city.

The total collapse of order in Tabriz was aided by a mushrooming of rival vigilante groups theoretically responsible for maintenance of order. There were police and SAVAK officials being hunted down, old enemies trying to obtain vengeance, two rival "committee" groups (one under Ayatollah Ghazi Tabatabai'i and the other under a Mullah named Benabi) trying to gain supremacy, pitched battles at various of the police

precincts, the university hospital and the television station, and lynch mobs in full scale operation (12 policemen, SAVAK and others were hung from trees in a two-day period).

There was also a collapse of the traditional communications network. Ex-officials and a multitude of others moved from one house to another, seeking what they thought would be a "safe" place for the night. Telephones were either not being answered, or lines would be disconnected and go dead, making it next to impossible to get in touch with whoever was, for the day at least, in charge of "security". Civilian (committee) guards for the Consulate would show up and then disappear, claiming quite frankly that they were afraid to stay.

During the evening of February 15, no committee guards showed up at the Consulate, and the Iranian Air Force guards who had been patrolling the exterior perimeter also disappeared. I tried calling the committee headquarters, the home of Ayatollah Ghazi-Tabatabai'i, and General Imanian's office, but despite promises and assurances from all parties had no success in actually obtaining a guard force. My own two night guards (unarmed contract employees) did come to work, and considering the status of the streets and the position of the house (in the far corner of the compound), the eight prisoners and I slept on the floor of the office building.

By the next morning, the replacement guards had not shown up, but I dismissed the night guards and tried again to get a committee guard force, again with no luck. At about 10:15 a.m., while the "prisoners" were preparing a late breakfast in the house and I was sitting in the office lobby (having finally gotten in contact with Tehran and described an "uneventful" morning in Tabriz), I saw four or five men jump over the back wall from the "Point Four" empty field into the garage area. They immediately opened fire, spraying the office at random.

Diving into a protected hallway, I ran for a telephone and used the one number I had (by chance) in my pocket -- a number belonging to a "revolutionary" friend whose family were all committee members. His mother answered

and I explained that an unknown group was attacking the Consulate. She promised to send help, and I hung up the phone and went back into the corridor. The firing continued for about fifteen more minutes and suddenly the group burst into the office building. I called out that I was alone and unarmed, and as soon as the group realized I was the Consul (by asking, and then by reading the Persian M.F.A. identity card I was carrying), they tied my hands, and while two of them began smashing pictures, tipping over furniture, etc., the others took a length of rope and put a noose around my neck (cursing, screaming, pushing and slapping in the meantime).

They were looking for a place to attach the other end when a much larger group of "militia" rushed through the gates of the compound and entered the office lobby. The two groups were obviously well acquainted, and the leader of the second group (having arrived as a result of my phone call for help, or part of a pre-planned second wave to save my life? -- I still don't know) immediately stopped the lynching proceedings. The second group joined the first in what was turning out to be a general trashing of the office and, leading me at gunpoint, forced me to open the two vault doors in the "security" area.

After loading all the tear-gas cannisters, the shotguns, revolvers, bullets and radios into sacks, they also took the Consulate impression and rubber seals, the visa plate and visa ribbon. They had already taken my wallet, diplomatic passport and MFA I.D. card. After a thorough search of all the rooms in the building, the group led me towards the house and rounded up the eight ex-prisoners.

A special bus had been sent to the Consulate compound by the committee, and after being forced on (the whole procedure being carried out at gunpoint) and told to lie down, the nine of us were taken to Committee Headquarters (at this point the former "Youth Palace" in the center of the city). There we were put into a room already occupied by two people described as captured members of SAVAK, and by guards who sat with guns pointed at us.

It was perhaps two hours later that an interrogator finally came in. He took down my description of events of the day, and then one by one had each of the

"prisoners" relate their experiences from the day they had arrived in Iran until their arrival at the committee prison. The narratives were written in Persian (presumably according to the way each person told his story) and each of us was forced to sign the "narrative/confession".

The whole process took several hours, partly because of the semi-chaos which reigned in and around the building. There was general pandemonium outside as the revolutionary militia continued to bring in "captives" and the large crowds gathered near the front of the "Youth Palace" surged around each newly-arriving vehicle. In the building itself the corridors were packed with jostling groups bellowing out orders and questions, and curious "militia" (often very young boys carrying the omnipresent automatics) would constantly open the door and wander into our makeshift cell. The sound of shooting was almost continuous.

After several hours, Yaghoub Barghelame and Ali Reza Kimya, whose family home I had called during the attack, finally located me. They said they had gone to the Consulate but I had already been taken away, had checked Committee Headquarters unsuccessfully, and then had made a round of all the local hospitals before returning to check the detention rooms one by one.

Their arrival caused an immediate change in the atmosphere, and several members of the committee also soon arrived in a state of embarrassment to ask the guards why I was being detained. A release order for myself was given immediately, but they explained that the eight foreign "ex-prisoners" would have to remain in detention since their cases had never come to trial. I refused to leave the building unless they could leave with me, and capitalizing on the committee members' acute discomfort at my presence, said that I simply would not abandon my non-Persian speaking charges to what was a chaotic and lawless situation. If they had to stay, I would stay in prison with them.

After about an hour of arguing back and forth, and faced with what he realized was growing into an increasingly embarrassing predicament, Barghelame finally left the jailroom and said he would arrange an immediate trial for the eight. After perhaps two hours, he returned. By chance a group of "judges" had been meeting with the

Public Prosecutor, and my friend managed to get the cases of the eight pushed through. We were finally allowed to leave together at about 8:00 p.m., and proceeded to Yaghoub Barghelame's house. It was from there that I finally called the Embassy.

Yaghoub Barghelame offered the use of his own home for the night, but after he explained that the Consulate had a full set of Air Force guards, I decided to return there. We arrived back at the Consulate at about 10:00 p.m., passing a member of the Air Force just leaving the main gate with several Consulate-owned pictures under his arm...the looting by the Air Force had long since commenced.

That should have been indication to me, but I unconsciously let it pass, and simply said good-bye to my committee "protector". Events took an immediate and most decided 180° turn as soon as Barghelame left, and instead of being protected, I soon realized that we were once again prisoners.

From our arrival back at the Consulate that evening until the next afternoon, the Air Force guards went out of their way to degrade us as much as possible. Forced to sit at gunpoint, we were subject to constant cursing and threats, and I was not allowed to use the telephone, enter any other room in the house other than the one in which we were being held, or in general make any movement at all without the permission (frequently not granted) of one of the many gun-toting guards.

During the seemingly endless hours of this treatment, my own psychological state was not helped by overhearing groups of our new captors discuss the various possibilities of subjecting us to a "people's trial", or the alternative suggestion that we simply be shot and that they claim we had started a fight to get their guns. (Most of the guards did not realize I spoke Persian, and none knew that I could understand their Turkish.)

It was almost noon when the discussion/arguments about retention or disposal of the lives of the nine of us were reaching a peak (I was not passing on any translations to the others, since I did not want the Air Force guards in general to realize I could understand them, and especially did not want a panic reaction from my eight fellow captives), that an Air Force officer

arrived to inspect the premises. Making an excuse to take him into a different room, I explained what was going on, and he immediately offered assistance. Standing guard at my bedroom door to prevent interference, he let me call the Embassy and I explained the problem. He also promised to stay until another group came to relieve the first guard detachment.

Within a surprisingly short time (perhaps another two or three hours) a Dr. Ragai'i arrived from the Committee Headquarters, explaining that he had been ordered by Tehran to investigate the situation. He took almost immediate action, changing the guard detachment and giving the new guards a long lecture about Khomeini's instructions vis-a-vis foreigners, diplomats, et al, and the consequences if anything were to happen to us. The result was a perceptible change in the atmosphere. Dr. Ragai'i came back to the Consulate some hours later, and explained that arrangements had been made for a plane to take us to Tehran the next day.

The final night in Tabriz was typical of almost all those of the weeks leading up to it: Gunfire all night long and once again the dubious comforts of the cellar floor, but at least the attitudes of our captor/protectors had changed for the better. By the next morning, they had even reached the point where they allowed the eight ex-prisoners and me to collect most of my personal possessions and move them over to the office vault room, although I was still ordered not to try to take anything with me.

By about 10:00 a.m. the bus which was to deliver us to the airport arrived, and it was just shortly before my departure that the committee representative, Dr. Ragai'i, consented to let each of us take an extra set of clothing. (The eight ex-prisoners had lost all of their own possessions in the prison fire, and I had already given each of them a set of my own clothes in lieu of their prison uniforms.) Thus we were able to pack two suitcases and a few pillowcases among us.

At the last possible moment, Dr. Ragai'i also told me I could take my family photographs and some monogrammed family silver too, so I went back to the vault to retrieve a sack which I had prepared some days before.

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Since I was alone for a few minutes in the building, I quickly took the opportunity to smash the Consulate radio and left the building sack in hand.

After all the week's long chaos and danger, the trip to Tehran was almost anti-climactic. An Iranian Air Force plane was waiting for us at the Tabriz Airport, and after being thoroughly searched for the Nth time, we took off at 1:00 p.m. and arrived at Mehrabad Airport an hour later. Air Force personnel eventually arranged for our transportation to the Embassy (in an ambulance, so that no one in the streets would stop the vehicle) and we arrived at the Embassy in the early evening of February 18th. The Austrian, Australian and two West German prisoners left soon after for their own embassies, the four American prisoners were immediately processed through the evacuation line (departing Iran the next day), and I have remained in Tehran since.

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The following information was obtained from the records of the
 Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice,
 Washington, D.C.

DATE: March 25, 1979

REPLY TO: Michael J. Metrinksy
ATTN OF: PolOff, Amembassy Tehran

SUBJECT: No Ruz with a Persian Family

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memorandum

METRINKS CHRON

TO: The Files

Z and his wife are friends of mine of some two years' standing. Solidly middle class, they are part of the early 30's generation of a family which has been land-owning and government-involved for well over a hundred years. Both employed in government ministries, Z and M are also first cousins, carrying on a long family tradition of cousins marrying cousins, and their comfortable new flat (in a large apartment building owned by Z and his brothers) was this year's center for the customary No Ruz "gathering of the clan".

From the dinner for twenty given by Z and M on Wednesday evening to brunch the following day, approximately 40 to 50 friends and relatives came to pay No Ruz greetings. The guests included movie producers, police officers, government officials, old family servants, students just back from school abroad, businessmen, and military visiting Tehran on "No Ruz" leave. Practically the sole topic of conversation was politics and the effects of the revolution on daily life, and as people came and went the same themes were discussed over and over:

Ayatollah Khomeini - With one exception (an older "Haji" member of the gathering who ^{was} soon silenced) just about everyone took the occasion to criticize Khomeini, in a range of statements from claiming he was a doddering old fool to serious concern that he was a dangerous fanatic. The women especially, from the recently returned M.S. graduate from London to my host's elderly widowed mother, expressed an almost emotional contempt for the Ayatollah and his proclamations. One elderly relative, who had never been known to actively engage in anything but being a housewife, said that she had been so upset at the "chador" statements by Khomeini that she had participated in the women's marches of last week, and there was a very evident and constantly mentioned feeling among the twenty or so wives and daughters that the Ayatollah was a fool who was trying to interfere in their lives and take away their rights. From his statements about "frozen meat" ("Am I supposed to kill a sheep on the front steps every time I prepare dinner?") to wearing the "hejab" ("I work just like my husband does, and nobody can tell me how to



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dress for work!"), all of the women expressed extreme dissatisfaction with Khomeini. ("We just got rid of one dictator. We don't want another one.") They lost no opportunity to let all the men know how they felt.

The Referendum - No one at all seemed to be in favor of the form the referendum would take, and the lack of freedom implied in the balloting, with the requirement that each voter's identity card be stamped, came in for considerable criticism. The general consensus of those present was that they would not bother to vote, since there was no choice involved and the result was a foregone conclusion.

Political Participation - The large group of people present at Z's house represented a cross section of middle-class Iran, and their expression of political participation in "post-revolutionary Iran" was almost beautifully Persian in a traditional sense. While just about everyone present made a great deal of noise about "freedom" and "democracy", it was quite apparent that almost none of them were willing to actively and positively engage in bringing about such a state of affairs in Iran. Their real concern with the present government was who knew whom, and which friends could fix what. A great deal of comment was made about political prisoners and the lack of security, but when I would ask about former high-ranking friends of members of the group, there would be a quick and almost embarrassed change of subject. ("Lt. Governor S.? Oh, I didn't really know him that well. I haven't seen him in ages...") It was quite apparent that cynicism towards politics in general, combined with a desire to use the new politics and/or politicians, far outweighed any deep concern for revolutionary ideology. Everyone was ready to complain but everyone was just as ready to work with the new system as long as it was to his benefit.

The Latest Plaything/Guns - One theme that was constantly repeated, but somewhat limited to the younger (in late teens to mid-thirties) males was where and how to get a gun. The same group who intensely debated the merits of their automobiles two years ago, and the best places to see in Europe last year, put similar warmth into long

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talks on the most suitable weapon to own. Despite all government and Ayatollah-inspired warnings on use or possession, every one of the younger males was either trying to find, or already had, a gun. Perhaps because of the long forbidden nature of the objects, or as an expression of their macho-ism, or because they really feel a threat to the security of their own homes and families, the younger men and teen-agers now see possession of a gun as a vital necessity.

Economic Effects of the Revolution - The shake-up in the Persian government bureaucracy and the economic system had deeply affected almost everyone of those present at the No Ruz gathering, and quite basically, they do not know what they're going to do about it yet. Of the four recently-retained graduate students from abroad, only one has been partially successful in finding a job (and that as only a translator, not in a field related to his studies). One guest worked at the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, and has no idea of whether the office will continue to exist. Another is at the Ministry of Tourism, and suspects he may be rifled soon. Two of the older men present are movie producers whose many years' investment in films and dependence on continuing royalties is now in very real danger from the "Islamic" censors who have forbidden showing of most of their films. One widow exists on her husband's pension from the Imperial Court, and the police major's unease over his future prospects was apparent in all the questions he asked about immigration to America.

Comment: Despite the holiday apparel, holiday foods, and cynical laughter over Khomeini, it was clear that there was serious unease over the group's prospects in a retributive Islamic Republic. Solidly middle-class in outlook, ideologically passive, and "Moslem" more in name perhaps than in practice, most of the guests showed a deep uncertainty underneath the laughter and conversation. Their once secure world of trips abroad, good clothing, new cars and investments in land and business has been badly shaken, and they are still not sure how to cope with what has happened. Given a return to pre-revolutionary social and economic normalcy, they will adjust to the new Iranian power structure and, indeed, will soon be as

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firmly entrenched as they ever were. Given a serious attempt by the religious and civil authorities to enforce a rigid Islamic code, however, they may find themselves required either to actively oppose the new regime, or to seek ways to emigrate from Iran.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: 27-28 March, 1979

PLACE: The B's Family Home, Tehran

PARTICIPANTS: Michael J. Metrisko, EmbOff *ing*
Mr. and Mrs. B, Private Sector
Mr. and Mrs. Mustapha B., Ministry of
Agriculture

NOTE: Socially, the B family could perhaps best be described as Iranian landed gentry. The elder Mr. B has an estate of some 8,000 hectares (about 20,000 acres) in the area of Saveh, and his land has remained intact since well before the White Revolution's land distribution policy. Long before that period they had mechanized their large agricultural holdings, and they have continued to farm actively up until the present. The elder Bs have also had excellent political connections, with one the child of a former Prime Minister, and marriage ties to the leaders of the Ghashgha'i tribe. Mr. B was the Director of the Agricultural Bank under Mossadeq, and he himself is a nephew of Dr. Mossadeq. Mr. B has been asked several times to accept the post of Minister of Agriculture, and has most recently turned down both Bakhtiar's and Bazargan's requests that he join their governments. He says he preferred to concentrate on his own land.

Mustapha B is presently working at the Ministry of Agriculture, a position he took several months ago. Previously, he was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with his last assignment being to CENCO Headquarters in Ankara. Upon his marriage to a Turkish girl, he was required to resign from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and he returned to Iran last fall.

The several hours conversation we had on Tuesday evening over dinner and drinks, and over breakfast on Wednesday morning could best be characterized as pessimistic and lacking in hope for Iran.

Personal and Political Future

The elder Bs have decided that they must leave Iran, and plan to emigrate to either Canada or the USA. Mr. B spoke at great length

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on his love for Iran and his attachment to his family holdings, but says that he is simply afraid to stay here now. Because of his family and political connections to Mossadeq, he was under suspicion for many years from the Pahlavis, he claims. He had always been opposed to them, but despite this, he still felt safe enough to continue living in Iran. A close friend of Bazargan, he was in the forefront of those who wanted a revolution, but the effects of the revolution have terrified him. In the past weeks, Mr. B's land has been taken over by his own workers, and he sees no way in which he can again get control. He and his wife have decided to abandon their land and emigrate rather than to stay in Iran any longer.

A very proper nationalist, the elder Mr. B first treated me to a long lecture on how the United States had caused all the trouble in Iran by its long support of the corrupt, thieving, and tyrannical Shah. He was also unforgiving of America for overthrowing his uncle, Dr. Mossadeq. After a few hours and a few drinks, Mr. B proceeded to another lecture, this time claiming that all the present trouble in Iran was caused by the United States' plotting the revolution which overthrew the Shah. At least under the Shah there had been personal security, he said, and America's lack of support for the Pahlavis had resulted in the present crisis. Realizing that America would always be the scapegoat for Mr. B, I made no attempt to point out the paradox in his very-Persian logic. Despite America's perfidy, the two elderly Bs are now determined that it is the only country in which they really want to live, and they are trying to convince their only son to come with them.

The elder Bs are convinced that within the next year or two the "Communists" will take over Iran. They see all the calls for ethnic autonomy as Soviet inspired, and fear that neither the armed forces nor the police will be in any condition to stop a take over.

Mustapha B is the only son and thus heir presumptive to the 8,000 hectare estate. With his education in England and the United States moreover, plus his several years of assignments abroad with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the addition of a foreign wife, Mustapha B has far less reason than his father to be attached to life in Iran. While Mustapha is attempting to continue his career and hopes to some day regain control of the family lands, his wife and parents are putting a great deal of pressure on him to pull up his stakes and leave Iran for good.

Mustapha is already discouraged about Iran's future. In the Ministry of Agriculture, neither the Minister nor his ministry as a whole seems able to get their act together. People come late (if

at all) to work, sit and discuss politics over their tea, then leave as quickly as possible. Despite all the hue and cry about the importance of agriculture, there is no planning or activity at all originating in the Ministry.

Mustapha B is convinced that the Fedayeen will emerge as the real power source in Iran, since they have the discipline and arms to complement their ideology. As an example, he described the vast differences in Fedayeen and Mujaheddeen stationed near his own office building. During the heavy downpours in Tehran on 26 and 27 March, the Mujaheddeen guarding one of their branches near the Ministry of Agriculture simply disappeared from sight. The heavy rain was stronger than their guard responsibilities. The Fedayeen in an adjacent building, however, retained a full guard force and all their discipline despite the elements.

Both Mustapha and his father have lost friends to the local political prisons, and the helplessness they feel, both vis-a-vis friends who have disappeared into Komitay jails and also their own security, have had an important effect on their views of the revolution.

The Mujaheddin, Fedayeen, Komitays, et al.

The bourgeois world of the Bs has been shattered by the lawlessness of the post-revolution era . . . lawlessness being defined apparently as anything interfering with the Bs comfort. Several examples were given of "atrocities" committed by the "revolutionary" thugs roaming the streets: A B friend, Dr. M, one of the leading physicians at the Tehran Heart Hospital, was pulled out of his car last week by revolutionary militia when they smelled liquor on his breath during an identity card check. The doctor was tied to a tree and flogged. One of the distant B cousins, a young girl, was walking on Abbassabad Street without a "chador" a few days ago. A passing group of thugs threw acid at her, and now her face is badly scarred. A whole series of similar stories were also recounted, and it was obvious the Bs had worked themselves into quite an anti-Khomeini and anti-"effects of the revolution" state.

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Files

FROM : NEA/IRN - Myles Greene

SUBJECT: Iran as Seen by Two Academicians

DATE: March 29, 1979

On March 28, NEA/IRN personnel had the opportunity to meet with and listen to a few of the US's leading non-governmental experts on Iran, some of whose comments are worth noting. We had a group discussion over lunch with Marvin Zonis (University of Chicago) and attended an evening panel discussion which included Richard Cottam (University of Pittsburgh), Jim Hoagland (Washington Post) and others. Following are highlights which were most relevant to Iranian affairs.

ZONIS (who readily admitted he had had no recent direct contact with Khomeini or members of the Bazargan government, although he had seen a wide range of other Iranians):

-- If a label must be put on him, Zonis said he was a pessimist about developments and trends in Iran.

-- He saw the revolution as an "Iranian social and political authentication." Islam was the vehicle for achieving this cultural identity.

-- He had in the past been impressed by Bazargan, whom he had seen several times since the early 1960's. But now Zonis has a number of concerns about Bazargan: the latter does not understand the military's importance on the Iranian scene; he has not established authority over the state; he does not have sufficiently strong ties with either the National Front or Khomeini (most of us present objected to the latter assessment). National Front membership in the Bazargan Cabinet is not useful; Sanjabi is a fool. Despite these problems, Bazargan does have some potentiality of becoming an eventual Mossadegh. His simplicity of style and living, as well as his nationalism stand out in that connection.

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-- Yazdi is a potential source of real danger. With his "rabid" religiosity and 10,000 armed men, he could follow Reza Kahn's path of the early 1920's. If Khomeini dies soon, Yazdi may move to take over leadership.

-- Matin-Daftari has no personal charisma, but his new group is potentially very important.

-- Given Iran's current troubles, the revolution may well lose some of its popularity; having participated in it may then no longer be the road to political power.

-- The women's march reflects the Westernized intelligentsia's growing unease with Khomeini's fundamentalism.

COTTAM (who has seen Khomeini and some of his people and is more favorably inclined toward them than is Zonis):

-- Iranians view the US, as well as the Soviet Union and the PRC, as imperialistic. The recent revolution is, in part, an effort to escape from imperialist control.

-- In the immediate future, Iran will be much closer to and supportive of the Third World, which the revolution's leadership sees as composed of fellow victims of superpower imperialism.

-- It is Khomeini's view that Iran's traditional "negative equilibrium" approach to foreign policy (balancing foreign pressures) will not now be necessary since Iran for a change is internally unified behind a nationalistic approach to foreign affairs. Cottom considers this a healthy development which will negate Iran's normal reliance on the "hidden hand" interpretation of Iranian foreign affairs.

-- Despite this turning away from the superpowers, Iran still needs recovery and stability and so, to achieve that, will be willing to pump oil for and carry out international trade with the major powers to the extent that such activities are needed to accomplish Iranian goals.

-- In its foreign policy, Iran will be an "Islamic messianic" activist in theory only. In practice, it will not seek Islamic goals in other countries. Already Iran has carefully avoided taking up the cause of Shia minorities in Iraq and Lebanon.

-- Since Iran is no longer the US's surrogate in the region, Iran has lost much of its influence there.

-- If Iran becomes even more destabilized than is the case now (as the Left seems to want), the super-powers will probably not be able to resist intervention as each attempts to forestall the expansion of influence by the other.

-- It is a mistake to view the Iranian revolution as a fundamental reaction against modernization; many of the revolution's leaders (including to a degree Khomeini himself) favor modernization. It was the Shah's leadership and economic problems that were the revolution's immediate causes.

-- The question is not who will succeed the Shah; Khomeini has already accomplished that. The real question is whether Bazargan will survive.

-- State Department policy seems now to be to accept Khomeini as a useful anti-Soviet force. Khomeini's assumption of power is, for the long run, not viewed as a bad development after all. Within the Middle East the US does not seem to have learned the lesson of 1953 when we made the mistake of taking action running in the face of internal Iranian social and political trends. Now we are running in the face of internal Arab social and political trends. Watch out!

cc: ~~Embassy~~ Tehran - Mr. Lambrakis
NEA - Deputy Asst. Sec. Crawford
INR/RNA/SOA - Mr. Griffin

NEA/IRN *McGreene*:sw

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: 31 March 1979

PLACE: Tehran

PARTICIPANTS: Michael J. Metrisko, Embassy Officer *my*
Housang A, Private Sector

Note: I've known A since June 1978, when he returned to Tabriz from San Francisco to oversee the construction of a new family home. A has permanent resident status in the United States, but was pressured by his parents to return for a few months so that a member of the family could be present to supervise the construction workers. Because of general unrest, labor problems in Tabriz, and finally the revolution, A has stayed for longer than he originally planned. He now intends to depart for San Francisco within the next three weeks.

Without the onus of attachment to a particular job in Iran, and with the benefit of being financially independent, A has been free to sit back and watch recent events in Tabriz unfold. He was engaged for a long period to Queen Farah's first cousin and thus has many acquaintances and friends on the fringes of the former court circle. The combination of his family background, much leisure time, money, intelligence, and a very bohemian attitude enabled him to enjoy a very active and varied social life during these past ten months in Tabriz.

A claims that business in general, and especially the government bureaucracy in Tabriz is almost at a complete standstill. During the past few weeks, A has had to go to several different offices in the city in order to complete work involved with the new family house, and from the municipality to individual shops the scene is the same: Friends and co-workers simply sit and drink tea, with no effort being made to attend to paperwork or new transactions. A few days ago A and another friend had work in the Tabriz Ministry of Agriculture branch and were absolutely unable to accomplish anything despite almost four hours of sitting and sipping tea. While the office workers were polite and friendly, they simply kept a four-hour political discussion going and refused (or were unable) even to begin processing any work. The

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same was true at the Municipality Building, where A was trying to straighten out a recent inheritance, and at several other offices A has had to deal with recently. It was not a question of some one's refusing to do a particular task, A claims, but an almost total inability of anyone to do anything at all. Even during the months-long office strikes, one could pass a bribe and get one's work completed. Now everyone is terrified of taking a bribe, and the will to work seems to have disappeared. A's father is the director of a construction firm, and the company's projects have drifted to a dead halt in the past several months. One major project, the construction of airplane shelters and living quarters at the Tabriz Air Force Base, simply ceased to exist in the autumn, and no one seems to know about payment for completed work or the possibilities of continuing. No one seems to know, and no one is even willing or able to discuss it. Another major company project was construction of a highway in the Ardebil area, and once again, payments and possibilities for resuming work have been relegated to a vague and distant hereafter.

A claims that Tabriz is still being ruled by the "Committees," and prospects of the police resuming normal functions seem slim. During the much publicized "Police and Armed Forces" demonstration in favor of the revolution, the Air Force participants refused to let any police take part. (Note: During the first days after the fall of the Bakhtiar government, precinct houses and the Police Headquarters were badly attacked. A high percent of the 700 casualty figure given for that week in Tabriz is attributed to fighting between the people and the police.) A large number of police are in prison pending investigation and trial, and apparently ill feeling still prevails.

A also said that during the past week a delegation of investigators was sent to Tabriz by Khomeini. A and another friend (a prominent Tabriz businessman) spoke at length to one of the delegates, a Qom-based mullah. The mullah spent the evening with the two, and A vented all of his feelings to the mullah about misuse of power in Tabriz by the Committee groups and many members of the local clergy. The mullah told A that both Shariat-madari and Khomeini were well aware of the Committee and clergymen's abuses of power in post revolution Iran, but that the two Ayatollahs were not able to do anything about it yet. Neither of the two Ayatollahs were yet ready to break with the Committees or attack members of the lower clergy, fearing that such a step would only cause more trouble in Iran. The two Shiite leaders did not feel confident enough of their own political strength to try to bring local religious leaders to account, fearing that it would affect the whole religious hierarchical structure in Iran.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 3543

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/3/85 (TOMSETH, F.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: IRAN'S REFERENDUM AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: TURNOUT FOR IRAN'S REFERENDUM WAS LARGE AND THE VOTE WAS OVERWHELMINGLY IN FAVOR OF THE NATION'S FORM OF GOVERNMENT BECOMING AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. HOWEVER, THE WAY IN WHICH THE REFERENDUM WAS ORGANIZED AND CONDUCTED HAS LEFT SOME ELEMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY DISGRUNTLED. WHETHER THIS DISGRUNTLEMENT CAN BE CONTAINED OR NOT WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER A SENSE OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN THE FORMULATION OF IRAN'S NEW CONSTITUTION IS ACHIEVED, AND WHETHER RAPID PROGRESS IS MADE TOWARDS ITS PROMULGATION. THE PROSPECTS IN THIS REGARD ARE NOT PARTICULARLY GOOD SINCE THE GOVERNMENT HERETOFORE HAS BEEN IN THE POSITION OF REACTING TO KHOMEINI'S PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE SHAPE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC RATHER THAN TAKING THE LEAD IN DEFINING ITS PARAMETERS. THE GOVERNMENT MUST CAPUTE THE INITIATIVE ON THIS ISSUE IF IT IS TO PREVENT PRESENT GRUMBLING FROM BEING TRANSFORMED INTO ACTIVE, PERHAPS VIOLENT OPPOSITION. END SUMMARY.

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3. IRAN'S REFERENDUM HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND THE NATION DECLARED AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AS OF APRIL 1 BY THE GREAT LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IS CLAIMING A TURNOUT OF 18 MILLION AND AN OVERWHELMING VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE REPUBLIC. WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THE LATTER, WHICH WAS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION IN ANY EVENT. THE TURNOUT, TOO, WAS UNDOUBTEDLY LARGE, AT LEAST IN TEHRAN AND REPORTEDLY OTHER MAJOR URBAN AREAS. HOWEVER, GIVEN WIDESPREAD ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS SUCH AS SHORTAGES OF BALLOTS, THE LACK OF POLLING STATIONS IN REMOTE RURAL AREAS, CONCERTED EFFORTS TO DISRUPT THE VOTING IN MUCH OF KURDESTAN, AND FIGHTING IN THE GOMBAD KAVOUS AREA OF GORAN PROVINCE WHICH PREVENTED MANY VOTERS THERE FROM GOING TO THE POLLS, WE DOUBT THAT THE TURNOUT WAS MUCH AS CLAIMED BY MINISTER OF INTERIOR JAVADI (98 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ELECTORATE).

4. WITH THE REFERENDUM A SOMEWHAT SUPERFLUOUS POINT HAS BEEN MADE, I.E., THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF IRANIANS FAVOR THE ABOLITION OF THE PAHLAVI MONARCHY. PERHAPS IT WAS POLITICALLY NECESSARY TO STATE THE OBVIOUS IN THIS REGARD, BUT THE MANNER IN WHICH THE REFERENDUM WAS ORGANIZED AND CARRIED OUT NEEDLESSLY CREATED CONTROVERSY AND PROVOKED UNHAPPINESS AMONG A NUMBER OF POLITICALLY AWARE IRANIANS. GRIEVANCES RANGED FROM THE WAY IN WHICH THE PROPOSITION THAT IRANIANS WERE ASKED TO VOTE ON WAS FORMULATED TO THE LACK OF CHOICE AVAILABLE ON THE BALLOT. FURTHER, THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF THE VOTING WAS SO AD HOC AND OFTEN HAPHAZARD THAT CONTINUING CONTROVERSY IS ALMOST CERTAINLY ASSURED.

5. HOW THE GOVERNMENT PROCEEDS HEREAFTER WILL IN LARGE MEASURE DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT ITS RATHER HAM-HANDED HANDLING OF THE REFERENDUM WILL RESULT IN LASTING DAMAGE. IF THE NEW DRAFT CONSTITUTION IS MADE PUBLIC IN THE NEAR FUTURE (AS GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN AMIR ENTEZAM SAYS IT WILL BE), IT A PUBLIC DEBATE OF ITS CONTENTS IS ALLOWED (AS AGAIN ENTEZAM HAS ASSURED WILL HAPPEN), AND IF A FREELY ELECTED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY IS EMPOWERED TO MAKE REVISIONS WHICH MIGHT BE DEEMED NECESSARY AS A RESULT OF THE PUBLIC DEBATE (AS PM BAZARGAN HAS INTIMATED), THEN THE ODDS THAT THE DISGRUNTLEMENT WHICH SURFACED ON THE ISSUE OF THE REFERENDUM CAN BE CONTAINED AND PERHAPS EVEN MUTED SHOULD BE REASONABLY GOOD. HOWEVER, IF THE CONSTITUTION IS PRESENTED AS A DIVINELY-INSPIRED AND IMMUTABLE, IT DOES NOT PROVIDE THE KIND OF LIBERTIES AND LEGAL DUE PROCESS NEAR AND DEAR TO THE HEARTS OF THE MODERNIST, SECULARIZED ELEMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY, AND IF THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR GENUINE AUTONOMY--PERHAPS UNDER A FEDERAL STRUCTURE--FOR IRAN'S ETHNIC MINORITIES, THERE WILL BE TROUBLE.

6. IN ADDITION, THE SPEED WITH WHICH THE GOVERNMENT MOVES WILL BE OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE. IT CANNOT AFFORD TO GET BOGGED DOWN IN AN INTERMINABLE DEBATE OVER THE FORM THE CONSTITUTION WILL TAKE OR THE ISSUE MAY VERY WELL BECOME MOOT. THERE ARE SEVERAL INCIPIENT POLITICAL MOVEMENTS WHICH ARE CLEARLY PREPARING FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A SEIZURE OF POWER BY NAKED FORCE OR EVEN ARMED CONFLICT. SOME AMONG THESE MOVEMENTS, MOST NOTABLY THE MARXIST FEDAYIN-E-KHALO, APPEAR TO BE DESIGNING THEIR STRATEGIES AT LEAST TENTATIVELY AROUND THE EXPECTATION THAT THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS TOWARD PROMULGATION OF A CONSTITUTION AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS PRESENTLY ENVISIONED BY THE GOVERNMENT WILL BREAK DOWN.

7. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT'S TRACK RECORD TO DATE CREATES LITTLE SENSE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE. DESPITE THE GOOD INTENTIONS OF THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF, THE GOVERNMENT HAS TOO OFTEN BEEN THE VICTIM OF ITS OWN LACK OF AUTHORITY, AND ABSENCE OF CAREFUL PLANNING, AND LAST (BUT NOT LEAST) KHOMEINI'S CONCEPT OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. THERE HAS BEEN AN APPARENT ASSUMPTION ON THE AYATOLLAH'S PART THAT WHAT IS INSPIRED BY GOD AND REVEALED TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF HIS OWN PRONOUNCEMENT WILL BE ACCEPTED UNIVERSALLY WITHOUT DEBATE. SUCH AN ASSUMPTION IS PROBABLY JUSTIFIED IN THE CASE OF MOST OF THE POLITICALLY UNSOPHISTICATED MUSLIM FAITHFUL, BUT IT IS PATENTLY WRONG WHEN IT COMES TO THOSE ELEMENTS OF IRANIAN SOCIETY WHICH HAVE DEFINITE IDEAS OF THEIR OWN OR HOW THEY SHOULD BE GOVERNED.

8. GIVEN KHOMEINI'S RETENTION OF THE ALLEGIANCE OF THE SHIA MASSES AND ITS OWN WEAKNESS, THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO TAKE THE LEAD IN DEFINING THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. RATHER, ITS ROLE IN THIS AREA HAS BEEN LARGELY LIMITED TO ATTEMPTS AT SOFTENING THE IMPACT OF KHOMEINI'S FREQUENTLY INTEMPERATE STATEMENTS AMONG THOSE WHO ARE PROFOUNDLY SCEPTICAL OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC TO BEGIN WITH. BUT UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT CAN SOMEHOW SEIZE THE INITIATIVE FROM KHOMEINI ON THE ISSUE OF THE REPUBLIC AND INCORPORATE IN ITS PROVISIONS THAT WILL BE GENERALLY SATISFACTORY TO ALL IRANIANS, THOSE WHO NOW ONLY GRUMBLE ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF AN RIGIDLY THEOCRATIC STATE WILL INCREASINGLY BE FORCED INTO ACTIVE, PERHAPS VIOLENT OPPOSITION TO IT.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS ON LIFE IN KERMANSHAH

PARTICIPANTS: PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER IN KERMANSHAH (MR. A)
MICHAEL J. METRINKO, POL OFFICER, AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TIME & PLACE: 7 APRIL 1979, TEHRAN

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NOTE: A. IS A KURD FROM ILAM, BUT FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS HAS BEEN LIVING IN KERMANSHAH. A IS MARRIED TO AN AMERICAN, AND HIS WIFE WAS DIRECTOR OF THE IRAN-AMERICA SOCIETY IN KERMANSHAH UNTIL ITS ENFORCED CLOSURE A FEW MONTHS AGO. A HIMSELF IS PRESENTLY DOING HIS MILITARY SERVICE AS A PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER IN KERMANSHAH.

ACCORDING TO A, THE CITY OF KERMANSHAH HAS BEEN VERY QUIET FOR SOME TIME, AND SLOWLY BUT SURELY THE "COMMITTEE" SYSTEM IS BEING REPLACED BY A MORE NORMAL GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY. ONE REASON MAY WELL BE WEAKNESS IN THE COMMITTEE STRUCTURE ITSELF. SOME TIME AGO THE MULLAH (AND SOME TIMES CALLED "AYATOLLAH") HEAD OF THE KERMANSHAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE, A MAN NAMED JALILI, WAS SUMMONED TO TEHRAN. HE HAS SINCE TOTALLY DISAPPEARED FROM THE KERMANSHAH SCENE, AND POPULAR RUMOR IN THE CITY CLAIMS THAT HE IS EITHER UNDER ARREST IN TEHRAN, OR HAS BEEN EXILED TO IRAQ. JALILI WAS THE SUBJECT OF MANY COMPLAINTS FROM PEOPLE IN KERMANSHAH ABOUT ABUSES OF POWER AND CORRUPTION DURING HIS REIGN AS COMMITTEE HEAD. ABOUT A WEEK AGO, A WAS ASKED TO COME TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S OFFICE, AND HE SAID THAT THERE WERE NO MUJAHEDDEEN-TYPE GUARDS IN EVIDENCE ANYWHERE IN THE BUILDING. WHILE THE GUBERNATORIAL RESIDENCE IN KERMANSHAH WAS TOTALLY DESTROYED AS A RESULT OF SEVERAL ATTACKS AGAINST IT DURING FIGHTING THIS PAST WINTER, THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE BUILDING REMAINS INTACT AND IS AGAIN BEING USED FOR ITS ORIGINAL PURPOSE. (NOTE: GENERAL POLIZBAN, THE LAST PRE-REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNOR GENERAL IN KERMANSHAH, IS STILL AT LARGE IN THE KURDESTAN-IRAQI BORDER AREA. POLIZBAN HAS BEEN ACCUSED BY THE PRESENT REGIME AS BEING A LEADING PROVOCATEUR OF THE RECENT KURDISH TROUBLES. HIS CHIEF ASSISTANT, LT. GOVERNOR JAHANSUZ, IS REPORTED TO BE IN GHASR PRISON IN TEHRAN.)

A SAYS THAT THE KERMANSHAH POLICE FORCE IS PARTIALLY FUNCTIONING, WITH TRAFFIC POLICE ON THE STREETS AND OTHER POLICE PRESENT IN VARIOUS PRECINCT HOUSES. ABOUT HALF OF EACH PRECINCT HOUSE FORCE, HOWEVER, IS STILL COMPOSED OF "MUJAHEDDEEN" TYPES. THE POLICE AND MUJAHEDDEEN APPARENTLY ARE WORKING TOGETHER FOR THE TIME BEING. DURING THE PAST WEEK, FIVE POLICE OFFICERS, ALL OF WHOM HAD RETURNED TO WORK, WERE ARRESTED AND ARE STILL BEING HELD PENDING

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INVESTIGATIONS. OTHER POLICE OFFICERS WITH WHOM A HAS SPOKEN ARE UPSET OVER THIS AND A LITTLE FRIGHTENED, SEEING IT AS OMINOUS FOR THEIR OWN FUTURES, BUT CONTINUE TO GO TO WORK ANYWAY.

A COMMENTED THAT WHILE THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM IN KERMANSHAH IS OFFICIALLY OPEN, DAILY PROGRAMS AND PROGRESS ARE STILL VERY QUESTIONABLE. STUDENTS IN VARIOUS SCHOOLS HAVE FORMED AD HOC "COMMITTEES" TO DECIDE ON THE REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS OF THEIR TEACHERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFFS, AND MANY FACULTY MEMBERS ARE NOT BEING ALLOWED TO RESUME TEACHING. A HIMSELF (DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE WAS ON ACTIVE STATUS AS AN ARMY OFFICER ATTACHED TO THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM AS A TEACHER) WAS WOUNDED WHILE TAKING PART IN AN ANTI-SHAH DEMONSTRATION THIS WINTER, SO HIS OWN CREDENTIALS ARE OK. HIS TWO YOUNGER BROTHERS WERE ALSO EXTREMELY ACTIVE AND VOCAL ANTI-SHAH DEMONSTRATORS. DURING THE EARLY WINTER, ONE BROTHER WAS ARRESTED WHILE LEADING A GROUP OF TEACHERS IN AN ANTI-SHAH MARCH IN ILAM, AND ANOTHER BROTHER WAS EXPELLED FROM THE AGRICULTURAL HIGH SCHOOL IN KERMANSHAH FOR BEING A "STUDENT-REVOLUTIONARY" LEADER. BOTH OF THESE YOUNGER BROTHERS HAVE NOW BECOME RECOGNIZED "YOUTH" LEADERS, ACCORDING TO A, AND THIS HAS ALSO HELPED HIS OWN REPUTATION. THE BROTHER AT THE AGRICULTURAL HIGH SCHOOL IS APPARENTLY CONSIDERED THE FINAL VOICE AS TO WHICH OF THE FACULTY SHOULD BE RETAINED, AND A CLAIMS THAT MANY OF THE LOCAL TEACHERS AND SCHOOL SYSTEM STAFF HAVE BEEN COMING TO HIS HOUSE IN EFFORTS TO GET A TO INTERCEDE FOR THEM WITH HIS BROTHER.

SINCE I FIRST MET A ABOUT ONE AND HALF YEARS AGO, HE HAS ALWAYS MAINTAINED A VERY STRONG "KURDISH NATIONALIST" STANCE. PROUD OF HIS KURDISH ACCENT AND CULTURE, A HAS MAINTAINED VERY CLOSE TIES WITH HIS EXTENDED TRIBAL (MALEK-SHAHI) GROUP. DESPITE THIS, HOWEVER, HE HAS BEEN NOTICEABLY RETICENT ABOUT PROFESSING "KURDISH AUTONOMY." FOR A, BEING A KURD IS A CULTURAL MATTER, NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH POLITICS OR THE CALLS FOR "INDEPENDENCE." HE HAS TALKED TO MANY FRIENDS FROM SANANDAJ ABOUT THE FIGHTING THERE, AND BELIEVES THAT THE FEDAYEEN/COMMUNIST GROUPS WERE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE. MORE OF A DEMOCRATIC LIBERAL THAN ANYTHING ELSE, A IS AS OPPOSED TO THE THREAT OF COMMUNISM AS HE IS TO THE "THREAT" OF KHOMEINI, SEEING BOTH AS THE WRONG ANSWER TO IRAN'S NEEDS.

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AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBSSY CAIRO
AMCONSUL DHARAN, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD.
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USLO RIYADH, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USDOSOUTH

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/8/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, PGOV, ELAB, ECON, SHUM, IR
SUBJ: POLITICAL SITREP, APRIL 8, 1979

1. (C - ENTIRE TEST)
2. SUMMARY: TRIALS, EXECUTIONS CONTINUE. GROWING UNREST
AMONG THE UNEMPLOYED. SHORTAGES AND PRICE INFLATION BECOME

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POLITICAL ISSUES. ACCIDENTS AND SHOOT-OUTS REMAIN PROMINENT FEATURES OF LIFE IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. TEHRAN UNIVERSITY CHANCELLOR ATTEMPTS TO END DEMONSTRATIONS ON CAMPUS. MADANI APPOINTED GOVERNOR GENERAL OF KHUZESTAN. ENTEZAM HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.

3. NINE MORE EXECUTIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE. A COURT PASSED DOWN DEATH SENTENCES ON FORMER AIR FORCE COMMANDER AMIR HOSSEIN RABI'I, LT. GEN. ALI MOHAMMAD KHAJENOURI, FORMER CABINET MINISTER AND GOVERNOR GENERAL OF FARS PROVINCE MANOUCHEHR AZMOUN, AND A POLICEMAN, (FNU) BALALI, IN TEHRAN EARLY APRIL 9. THE LATTER WAS CHARGED WITH MURDERING A NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN A TEHRAN MOSQUE AND BATH, BUT THE CHARGES AGAINST THE OTHER THREE WERE NOT SPECIFIED. RABI'I REPORTEDLY TOLD THE COURT THAT HE WAS SORRY HE HAD UNWITTINGLY SERVED A MAN WHOSE "EMPTYNESS" ONLY BECAME KNOWN TO HIM WHEN AN AMERICAN, GEN. HUYSER, THREW HIM OUT OF IRAN BY THE TAIL. ELSEWHERE, A POLICEMAN, MOHAMMAD BAGHER ROSTAMI, WAS FOUND GUILTY OF KILLING AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF PEOPLE BY A COURT IN QOM AND WAS EXECUTED LATE APRIL 7. IN DEZFUL, SEYED KAZEM ASHRAFZADEH AND RAHMAN ABDULLAHI, A POLICEMAN, WERE EXECUTED APRIL 8. ASHRAFZADEH WAS CONVICTED OF EXPROPRIATING LAND, COLLABORATING WITH THE PAHLAVI REGIME, AND VIOLATING OTHER PEOPLE'S RIGHTS. ABDULLAHI WAS CHARGED WITH KILLING A 16-YEAR OLD YOUTH DURING AN ANTI-SHAH DEMONSTRATION. IN SHIRAZ, LT. HOSSEIN MOKHTARI-ARDAKANI AND ABDOL RASOUL SHEIKHI, A POLICEMAN, WERE EXECUTED APRIL 8. NO CHARGES WERE SPECIFIED. FINALLY, A COL. NASER GHOLI HOUSHMAND, DESCRIBED IN THE PRESS AS THE HEAD OF SAVAK IN ISFAHAN FOR 12 YEARS, WAS SHOT WHILE ALLEGEDLY TRYING TO ESCAPE FROM GUARDS TAKING HIM FROM QOM TO ISFAHAN ON APRIL 8.

4. THE GOVERNMENT HAS TRIED TO PUT THE BEST FACE POSSIBLE ON THE RESUMPTION OF THE TRIALS AND EXECUTIONS, BUT ITS CHIEF SPOKESMAN, DEPUTY PM ENTEZAM, ADMITTED APRIL 8 THAT THE ISLAMIC COURTS ARE INDEPENDENT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL. ENTEZAM SAID THAT HE HAD NOT KNOWN IN ADVANCE THAT FORMER PM HOVEYDA'S TRIAL WAS TO BE RESUMED AND ONLY LEARNED OF HIS EXECUTION WHEN HE RETURNED HOME LATE SATURDAY EVENING. NONETHELESS, HE DEFENDED THE COURT'S ACTION, SAYING THAT HOVEYDA WAS A CRIMINAL WHO DESERVED TO DIE. HE DENIED THAT PM BAZARGAN WAS OPPOSED TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS SUCH. RATHER, HE HAD OBJECTED

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TO THE TRIALS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEIR CONDUCT WAS NOT GOVERNED BY ESTABLISHED RULES. NOW THAT FORMAL REGULATIONS HAVE BEEN PROMULGATED, HE SAID, THE TRIALS COULD GO FORWARD. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE LACK OF OPENNESS OF HOVEYDA'S TRIAL, ENTEZAM POINTED OUT THAT THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR HAS AUTHORITY TO DIRECT THAT TRIALS BE HELD IN CAMERA. WHEN HE WAS TOLD THAT A REPORTER FROM THE NEWSPAPER ETTELAAT--WHO ALSO HAPPENED TO HAVE A COMMITTEE CARD--WAS PRESENT AT HOVEYDA'S TRIAL, ENTEZAM SAID, "THEREFORE IT WAS NOT CLOSED." ENTEZAM ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD RECEIVED A NUMBER OF INTERESTED PARTY INQUIRIES FROM ABROAD ON BEHALF OF HOVEYDA, BUT SAID THAT THESE PEOPLE HAD NOT SUFFERED BECAUSE OF HIS CRIMES, THAT THEY HAD PROFITED FROM HIM, AND HENCE SUPPORTED HIM.

5. THERE ARE INCREASING REPORTS OF DEMONSTRATIONS BY MEMBERS OF IRAN'S ARMY OF UNEMPLOYED. TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY OF THE JOBLESS IN TABRIZ HAVE BEEN ON A HUNGER STRIKE FOR SEVERAL DAYS AND 45 OF THEM HAVE BEEN HOSPITALIZED. GROUPS OF SEVERAL HUNDRED MARCHED ON AYATOLLAH TALAGHANI'S OFFICE IN TEHRAN ON APRIL 7 AND 8 DEMANDING AN END TO PROMISES OF JOBS AND ACTION TO PROVIDE THEM. ONE SEGMENT OF THOSE WHO PARTICIPATED IN YESTERDAY'S DEMONSTRATION WAS SEEN EARLIER ALONG SAADI AVENUE AND WAS HEARD SHOUTING, "DEATH TO YOU AND ME WHO SAID DEATH TO THE SHAH." TALAGHANI HIMSELF WAS NOT IN HIS OFFICE, AND A SPOKESMAN FOR HIM TOLD THE DEMONSTRATORS TO TAKE THEIR COMPLAINTS TO THE MINISTRY OF LABOR. IN ISFAHAN ON APRIL 8 A GATHERING OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS WAS FIRED ON BY UNIDENTIFIED ASSAILANTS WHO KILLED ONE AND INJURED FOUR. THERE ARE OTHER REPORTS OF DEMONSTRATIONS IN SHIRAZ AND SARI. AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE APRIL 8 ENTEZAM ADMITTED THAT UNEMPLOYMENT IS HIGH. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW HOW HIGH, BUT SUGGESTED IT MAY BE MORE THAN THREE MILLION. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS DOING EVERYTHING IT CAN TO GET INDUSTRY BACK IN OPERATION SO THAT PEOPLE CAN GO BACK TO WORK.

6. GROWING SHORTAGES OF VARIOUS GOODS, TOO, ARE BEGINNING TO HAVE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ENTEZAM ACKNOWLEDGED THE PROBLEM BUT CLAIMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS WORKING HARD TO IMPORT SUCH THINGS AS CIGARETTES, CHICKEN, FRUIT AND BUTTER. HE URGED THE PUBLIC TO BE PATIENT. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT AS THESE

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IMPORTS CAME ON THE MARKET PRICES WOULD GO DOWN. RISING PRICES HAVE BEEN THE NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF DWINDLING SUPPLIES OF NUMEROUS ITEMS, A PHENOMENON KHOMEINI HIMSELF HAS BECOME AWARE OF. ON APRIL 8 THE AYATOLLAH APPEALED TO MERCHANTS IN THE NAME OF ISLAM NOT TO ENGAGE IN PRICE GOUGING AND HINTED AT DIRE CONSEQUENCES IF THEY PERSISTED IN IT.

7. ONE OF THE FEATURES OF LIFE IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN IS THE DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF SO MUCH WEAPONRY AND ORDINANCE BEING READILY AVAILABLE TO ALMOST ANYONE WHO WISHES TO LAY HANDS ON IT AND THE INEXPERIENCE MOST IRANIANS HAVE IN HANDLING IT. HARDLY A DAY GOES BY THAT THERE IS NOT SOME REPORT OF AN ACCIDENT INVOLVING GUNS AND EXPLOSIVES. ONE OF THE MOST TRAGIC OCCURRED APRIL 7 WHEN FIVE PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND FOUR OTHERS SERIOUSLY WOUNDED WHEN A BOMB THAT SUPPOSEDLY HAD BEEN DEFUSED EXPLODED. ACCORDING TO ONE OF THE INJURED, HE AND SEVERAL OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS WHO HAD DISCOVERED THE DEVICE FIRST ATTEMPTED TO BLOW IT UP BY SHOOTING INTO IT. ON OUR OWN COMPOUND THERE IS STILL SHOOTING EVERY NIGHT AND EVEN DURING THE DAYLIGHT HOURS AS MANY OF THE UNDISCIPLINED AND UNTRAINED PERSONNEL ASSIGNED HERE TO PROTECT US FIRE THEIR WEAPONS ACCIDENTALLY OR JUST FOR KICKS. THERE ARE ALSO FREQUENT SHOOT-OUTS BEYOND THE COMPOUND WALLS AS RIVAL GROUPS ENGAGE IN INTERNECINE GUERRILLA WARFARE. ON APRIL 7 TWO WOMEN ARMED WITH MACHINE GUNS ATTACKED A REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE HEADQUARTERS IN EAST TEHRAN FROM THEIR SPEEDING BMW.

8. CHANCELLOR MALEKI OF TEHRAN UNIVERSITY HAS ORDERED THAT THERE BE NO MORE DEMONSTRATIONS ON CAMPUS WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF THE UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION. THIS OBVIOUSLY REPRESENTS AN ATTEMPT TO BRING ONE OF THE MOST ACTIVE CENTERS OF POLITICAL FERMENT, WHERE THERE HAS ALSO BEEN FREQUENT VIOLENCE, UNDER SOME DEGREE OF CONTROL. WHETHER OR NOT THE UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION HAS THE MEANS TO BACK UP ITS WORDS, HOWEVER, REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

9. NAVY CHIEF MADANI, WHO RECENTLY GAVE UP HIS SECOND HAT AS DEFENSE MINISTER, HAS ACQUIRED A NEW ONE AS GOVERNOR GENERAL OF KHUZESTAN PROVINCE. THIS MAY FORESHADOW A MORE CENTRAL ROLE FOR THE NAVY IN SUCH MATTERS AS LOCAL SECURITY IN THE PROVINCE.

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10. OTHER ITEMS ENTEZAM COVERED IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A--IRAN HAS OVER 1,000 (SIC) CONTRACTS WITH THE U.S. ALONE, MOST OF THEM MILITARY IN NATURE. THESE MUST BE STUDIED BEFORE DECISIONS ON WHETHER TO CANCEL THEM OR CONTINUE THEM CAN BE MADE.

B--THE U.S. HAS NOT PROPOSED A NEW AMBASSADOR TO IRAN BUT IT IS NOT A MATTER OF HIGH PRIORITY FROM IRAN'S STAND-POINT. NEITHER THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR NOR ANY FOREIGNER HAS INFLUENCE IN IRAN.

C--SO LONG AS IRAN REMAINS ALERT, THE PRESENCE OF THE USS CONSTELLATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN OR OTHER WARSHIPS IN THE PERSIAN GULF WOULD NOT POSE A DANGER FOR IRAN.

D--RECRUITMENT FOR THE PARAMILITARY GUARDIANS OF THE REVOLUTION IS CARRIED OUT WITHOUT REGARD TO POLITICAL IDEOLOGY. OTHER ARMED GROUPS SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO MAKE TROUBLE AS THEY HAD IN KURDESTAN AND TURKOMAN SAHRAH.

E--REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE MEMBERS MAKING UNAUTHORIZED ARRESTS WILL BE PUNISHED. NAAS##

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POL 1
AMB FILE

Tuesday, April 10, 1979
Room 2172, RHOB
9:00 a.m.

Committee on Foreign Affairs

BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION IN IRAN BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM SULLIVAN

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1. Trends in country: is it likely to be very unstable for next year at least; how are economic realities impacting on revolutionary policies; what are the good and bad trends you see; how strong do you perceive anti-American feeling to be; how serious are regionalist sentiments.
2. Government-Religious leaders relations: law and order problems and Barzagan efforts to stabilize situation; continuing trials and executions -- what are trends; who governs Iran today?; what is the mood of people; what is situation in Tehran, other big cities, and rural areas; does Barzagan still enjoy the Ayatollah's confidence.
3. Security situation and leftist groups: what is security situation like today; who controls the streets of Tehran; who performs police function; what types of weapons are now in private hands; what is role of the leftist groups which are the principal ones and how much strength do they have; to what degree are they benefitting from their tighter organization.
4. Pro-Shah elements: have the pro-shah groups gone underground; do you see the possibility of SAVAK-types or military types that were supportive of Shah regrouping for possible action; what are these groups doing today?.
5. US presence today and the role of US Embassy: How many official Americans are in Iran today (embassy staff and military types); what US government facilities in the country are now not in our possession; what is security like at the embassy; who guards Embassy; can anyone gain access to the compound during embassy hours.
6. Future relations: what access have you and others had to the new government officials; what types of relations do they want with the US; How many military advisors do they want and in what roles; how do you see relations developing; what is extent of US investment and what investments are in jeopardy.
7. Iranian foreign policy: what trends are emerging in Iran foreign policy; how are ties today with East Bloc; what will be our major policy problems with Iran in coming months;
8. Iranian oil policy: what oil policies regarding production and price do you see the Iranian government following; do they want to maintain production above 3 m/b/d; are economic realities forcing them to increase production as much as possible; what is the situation among oil workers; do Iranians want foreign experts and technicians to return to help them.
9. Minorities: what is the situation for Bahais, Jews, Armenians, Assyrians and others today; is there any violence against them; are many seeking to leave; what is the mood in these communities.
10. Status of US military equipment and Iranian armed forces: do we have any knowledge of sensitive US equipment getting into unfriendly hands; status of F-14 and their security; unity of three armed services; control of bases; readiness of military;

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STATE
CHG: CWNAAS
POL: GBLAMBRAKIS: VAN
E/C: CTAYLOR

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, PRIORITY
INFO USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

E.O. 12065: GDS 4/11/85 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P
TAGS: PEPR, PINS, IR
SUBJ: THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT AND THE FUTURE

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: WE EXPECT THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT TO SLOG ALONG FOR SOME TIME YET, GRADUALLY GETTING MORE CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY'S AFFAIRS BUT WITH NO DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENTS. A MAJOR THREAT WILL ARISE IN THE FORM OF ECONOMIC DISAFFECTION, PARTICULARLY AMONG THE THREE TO FOUR MILLION UNEMPLOYED. THE GOVERNMENT WILL TRY TO CONTAIN THIS BY STRESSING THE VIRTUES OF THE ISLAMIC SIMPLE LIFE, CONTINUING TO BLAME THE SHAH AND FOREIGNERS FOR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, BUT ALSO FINDING A MEANS OF GETTING MONEY TO WORKERS THROUGH UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, MAKE-WORK PROJECTS, AND QUOTE START UP UNQUOTE CREDITS TO INDUSTRY. KHOMEINI'S INFLUENCE (IF HE LIVES) SHOULD PREVENT THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT BY VIOLENCE OF LEFT OR RIGHT WHILE THE REVOLUTION RUNS ITS COURSE. IN TIME, A NEW AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO SEIZE THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT, BUT THAT IS FAR IN THE FUTURE, AFTER THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT HAS HAD ITS DAY IN THE SUN. THIS ESTIMATE IS CONSIDERED OPTIMISTIC IN SOME OF ITS JUDGEMENTS BY SOME OF THE REPORTING OFFICERS AT POST. IT MAY HAVE TO BE REVISED IN A FEW WEEKS TIME. ITS MAIN PURPOSE

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AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, IS TO TAKE ISSUE WITH CERTAIN WASHINGTON ESTIMATES WE HAVE SEEN WHICH SUGGEST THE HIGH PROBABILITY OF A LEFTIST OR COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF POWER IN IRAN IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. WE DO NOT RATE THAT AS ANYTHING MORE THAN AN EXTREMELY UNLIKELY POSSIBILITY IF EVERYTHING REPEAT EVERYTHING GOES WRONG. END SUMMARY.

3. THE REFERENDUM CREATING AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC WAS HELD ON MARCH 30 - 31 AS SCHEDULED AND TOOK PLACE PEACEFULLY DESPITE DIRE PREDICTIONS THAT (A) IT WOULD BE FURTHER POSTPONED AND (B) THERE WOULD BE ARMED TROUBLE. WE HAVE HEARD FROM A FRENCH EMBASSY SOURCE THE REPORT THAT KHOMEINI INSISTED THE REFERENDUM BE HELD AS SCHEDULED, THREATENING TO CALL OUT THE PEOPLE FOR MARCHES IN THE MILLIONS AS A SUBSTITUTE, IF THE ELECTION OFFICIALS REFUSED TO HOLD IT THEN. THIS RINGS TRUE. IT MAY ALSO EXPLAIN THE PADDING OF FIGURES REGARDING TOTAL VOTER TURNOUT BY THE ELECTION OFFICIALS AFTERWARD. WE HAVE REPORTED ON THE REFERENDUM BY SEPTEL. IN THIS CABLE WE RAISE TO CONSIDER WHERE THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT STANDS AND WHERE IT MIGHT BE GOING.

4. IT IS BEST TO START WITH CERTAIN THINGS WE KNOW:

--A. AS REVOLUTIONARIES, BAZARGAN AND HIS PEOPLE ARE BASICALLY CONSERVATIVES. AMONG BAZARGAN'S CLOSEST COWORKERS, YAZDI APPEARS THE MOST RADICAL, BUT THAT PROBABLY STEMS FROM THE ROLE HE IS PLAYING AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMITTEES.

--B. THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT HAS MANY OTHER CONSERVATIVE LEADERS (SHARIATMADARI ET AL) AS WELL AS SOME A SHADE LESS CONSERVATIVE (TALEGHANI) AND SOME QUITE RADICAL IN THEIR SOCIAL IDEAS WHILE FANATICAL IN THEIR RELIGION. (A PORTION OF THE MUJAHEDDEEN -- THE COLLEGE EDUCATED ONES). KHOMEINI AND HIS CLOSEST AIDES SUCH AS DR. BEHESHTI DESIRE PUNISHMENT OF PAST MALEFACTORS AND A RETURN TO ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, BUT ALSO SHARE MANY CONSERVATIVE AIMS. THEY CONTINUE TO APPEAL TO THE MORE RADICAL REVOLUTIONARIES EVEN WHILE PERMITTING THE GOVERNMENT TO CARRY OUT A FAIRLY CONSERVATIVE POLICY. AS A MEASURE OF THIS UNDERLYING CONSERVATISM, LET US RECALL THAT KHOMEINI, TALEGHANI, SHARIATMADARI, AND THE OTHERS ARE ALL (A) FIERCELY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND (B) FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF A NATIONAL ARMY, DEFINED AS ONE THAT WILL OBEY THEM, NOT THE SHAH. THERE IS UNDERLYING STRAIN BETWEEN BAZARGAN AND KHOMEINI -- WHICH NO DOUBT EXPLAINS BAZARGAN'S THREAT (TO QUOTE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR UNQUOTE) TO REFUSE CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION. BUT KHOMEINI AND BAZARGAN NEED EACH OTHER, AND WE THINK

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DIFFERENCES WILL BE PATCHED UP TO PERMIT BAZARGAN TO RUN AND BE ELECTED PRESIDENT.

--C. THE MULLAHS OVERWHELMINGLY CONTROL THE MASSES, AND THEY ARE IN TURN LARGELY CONTROLLED BY VARIOUS AYATOLLAHS. KHOMEINI HAS PARAMOUNT CONTROL FOR THE MOMENT, BUT OTHERS SUCH AS TALEGHANI OR SHARIATMADARI RETAIN CONSIDERABLE RESIDUAL INFLUENCE.

--D. THE LEFT WING HAS NO MASS FOLLOWING. THE TUDEH IS WEAK, OTHER COMMUNISTS AND MARXISTS ARE ANTI-SOVIET, AND THE CHARIK FEDAYEEN GUERRILLAS ARE ONLY BEGINNING TO ORGANIZE POLITICALLY; THEY ARE YOUNG, MOSTLY COLLEGE-EDUCATED, WELL-ORGANIZED, AND ARMED, BUT THEIR POLITICAL FOLLOWING IS MINISCULE COMPARED TO THE RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT.

--E. FINALLY, KHOMEINI BY HIS FRUGAL LIVING WITH LITTLE MATERIAL WEALTH AND HIS EMPHASIS ON MORAL VALUES IS SETTING AN EXAMPLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY TO FOLLOW. THE PRIME MINISTER, THE HEAD OF NIOC, AND VARIOUS OTHER HIGH CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE OR ARE IN THE PROCESS OF ANNOUNCING CUTS IN THEIR SALARIES. THIS IS A MOVE WHICH SEEMS INTENDED AS A PRECEDENT TO BE FOLLOWED BY MORE AND MORE OF THE FAITHFUL. IF IT CATCHES ON AS A POLICY IT SHOULD DO MUCH MORE TO DEFUSE THE POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE ECONOMIC SITUATION. A GENERAL DEFLATION OF THE ECONOMY (LOWER RENTS, LOWER TAXES, PERHAPS EVENTUALLY LOWER PRICES) IS INTENDED AS A COMPANION MEASURE. ALSO, CALLS FOR CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE WELL-TO-DO HAVE BEGUN WITH KHOMEINI'S REQUEST FOR SUCH HELP IN BUILDING HOUSING FOR THE POOR. ADDITIONAL CALLS CAN BE EXPECTED.

5. ON THE OTHER HAND THERE ARE SOME THINGS WE DO NOT YET KNOW:

--A. WHEN WILL KHOMEINI DIE? IF THAT OCCURS SOON IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WILL SUFFER SEVERE INTERNAL PANGS OF LEADERSHIP, WHICH ITS OPPONENTS OF THE LEFT -- BUT ALSO PERHAPS OF A RENASCENT MONARCHICAL RIGHT -- COULD EXPLOIT.

--B. HOW DEEPLY ARE MARXISTS DUG IN AMONG SKILLED WORKERS IN THE OIL FIELDS AND ELSEWHERE? EVIDENCE TO DATE SUGGESTS A PROBLEM THERE. BUT NOT ONE THAT IS INSUPERABLE FOR THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. ARE THE ROOTS SECRETLY MUCH DEEPER THAN WE THINK? THAT IS A POSSIBILITY WE CANNOT DISMISS UNTIL WE HAVE MORE EVIDENCE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

--C. WHAT ROLE WILL THE UNARMED BUT SKILLED BOURGEOISIE PLAY IN THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS TO FOLLOW? SO FAR MANY OF THEM SYMPATHIZE WITH THE AIMS OF MATIN DAFTARY'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT OR ARE MEMBERS OF LIKE MINDED GROUPS WHO FEAR LONG-TERM DOMINATION BY THE MULLAHS AS MUCH AS A

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COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. IF THIS INFLUENTIAL CLASS IS NOT INTEGRATED INTO THE FRUITS OF THE REVOLUTION, THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY WILL SUFFER EVEN MORE THAN OTHERWISE AND THE LEFTISTS WILL APPEAR STRONGER THROUGH A TACIT ALLIANCE WITH THESE MODERATES AGAINST THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND ITS (BAZARGAN'S) GOVERNMENT.

6. WHAT DO THESE FACTORS AMOUNT TO?

--A. FIRST, THE PROBABILITY THAT BAZARGAN WILL SLOG ALONG MAKING SLOW PROGRESS TOWARD ONE GOAL AFTER ANOTHER (THE CONSTITUTION, A NEW PARLIAMENT, RECONSTRUCTION OF A VIABLE ARMY, ETC). THE REALITY OF KHOMEINI'S AND THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT'S POWER WILL SHIELD BAZARGAN FROM SERIOUS DAMAGE BY POTENTIAL LEFTIST OR RIGHTIST VIOLENCE. WE SHOULD NOT LOOK FOR ANY DRAMATIC BREAKTHROUGHS IN SECURITY, EFFICIENCY OR SOCIAL STABILITY AND HAPPINESS, HOWEVER. THIS PROCESS IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE FOR MANY MONTHS, PERHAPS EVEN YEARS. AS LONG AS HE REMAINS HEALTHY AND DOES NOT WEARY, THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR BAZARGAN AS P.M.

--B. WITH MANY PEOPLE STILL BELIEVING THAT THE REVOLUTION MUST CONTINUE, PRESSURE WILL REMAIN ON KHOMEINI AND INDEED BAZARGAN TO MAKE APPROPRIATE NOISES AND QUOTE REVOLUTIONARY UNQUOTE DECLARATIONS (SOME OF THEM IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUT MOST AT HOME) TO PREVENT TOO RAPID DISILLUSIONMENT OF THEIR ERSTWHILE FOLLOWERS. /THE MOBS HAVE BEEN STIRRED UP TO SHAKE THE EDIFICE UNTIL THE SHAH TOPPLED; NOW THEY MUST BE COAXED SLOWLY, GRADUALLY TO GO BACK TO WHAT THEY WERE DOING. IN MANY CASES THIS WILL MEAN FINDING NEW THINGS FOR MANY TO DO -- SUCH AS ENROLLING THEM IN THE NEW ARMY OR REVOLUTIONARY GUARD/

--C. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ECONOMY, AND LACK OF MATERIAL REWARDS FOR THE CHILDREN OF THE REVOLUTION, WILL UNDOUBT-ABLY KEEP POTENTIAL TROUBLE BREWING, PARTICULARLY IN AREAS OF THE ECONOMY (SOME STILL TO BE IDENTIFIED) WHERE A COMMUNIST OR OTHER LEFT WING ORGANIZATION IS ESTABLISHED AMONG THE WORKERS. THIS IS POTENTIALLY THE MOST DANGEROUS ISSUE, WHICH COULD BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT. WE SUSPECT, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH GRUMBLING WILL NOT REACH CRITICAL PROPORTIONS BECAUSE OF THE COUNTER-ACTION OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, WHICH IS PREACHING A SIMPLER, PIOUS LIFE FREE FROM THE CORRUPTING EFFECTS OF WESTERN-INSPIRED MATERIAL-ISM.

--D. IT IS IMPORTANT IN THIS CONNECTION, THOUGH, THAT EVERY ABLE-BODIED MAN HAVE SOME SORT OF INCOME. THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT WILL HAVE TO BE SOLVED -- PROBABLY BY JERRY-RIGGING AND AD HOC SOLUTIONS WHICH AMOUNT IN THE AGGREGATE TO LESS EFFICIENCY OF THE ECONOMY AS A WHOLE AND MORE UNDER-EMPLOYMENT. THIS REALITY WILL BE

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EXCUSED WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S ASSERTION THAT IT HAS PRODUCED GREATER ISLAMIC SOCIAL JUSTICE AND POPULAR HAPPINESS. --E. AS PART OF THE PROCESS MENTIONED ABOVE, WE SHOULD EXPECT A GREAT DEAL OF EXPERIMENTATION, MUCH BACKING AND FILLING BOTH IN POLITICS AND IN ECONOMICS. THIS IS ONLY NATURAL IN A COUNTRY WHICH LACKS EXPERIENCE IN MODERN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, WITH A GOVERNMENT WHICH REJECTS THE VIRTUES OF MODERN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS PRACTICED IN THE WEST. / THE SPECTRE OF A NEW AUTHORITARIANISM WILL REMAIN EVER PRESENT ON THE HORIZON, AS PEOPLE BATTLE WITH FRUSTRATION AND THE CROSS-CURRENTS OF COMPETING EASTERN AND WESTERN CULTURAL VALUES. AN AUTHORITARIAN "SOLUTION" QUOTE SOLUTION UNQUOTE IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO OCCUR SOME DAY -- BUT ONLY WHEN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT HAS HAD ITS MOMENT IN THE SUN AND RUN ITS COURSE. /

7. COMMENT BY CHARGE: I HAVE BEEN BACK IN TEHRAN ONLY TEN DAYS AND MY OWN THOUGHTS ON THE SUBJECT HAVE NOT YET JELLED. HOWEVER, I DO NOT WISH TO HOLD UP THIS THOUGHTFUL REPORT IN ORDER TO REACH A CONSENSUS. I SHALL SUBMIT MY OWN VIEWS IN DUE COURSE AND HAVE ASKED POLITICAL OFFICER STEMPER TO GIVE HIS OWN ANALYSIS BASED UPON HIS FOUR YEARS' EXPERIENCE HERE. NAAS##

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STATE
CHG: CWNAAS
POL: JDSTEMPEL
ECON: TAYLOR, ICA: ROSEN, POL: METRINKO AND GARRETT
POL

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
CINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE, IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI, IMMEDIATE
USICA WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USLO RIYADH, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USDOCOSOUTH

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 4/18/89 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, PROP, PORS, IR
SUBJ: THE ANTI-AMERICAN SYNDROME

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS A REPORTING MESSAGE; NO ACTION REQUIRED.)
2. SUMMARY: OVER PAST TWO WEEKS "THE ANTI-AMERICAN SYNDROME" (APOLOGIES TO JANE FONDA) HAS BECOME MORE PROMINENT,

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BOTH IN PRESS AND IN POLITICAL STATEMENTS. ROOT OF THIS IS KHOMEINI'S ANTI-WESTERN PARANOIA, FUELED BY ANIT-WESTERNISM OF PLO-INFLUENCED FEDAYEEN AND OTHERS. QUOTE ANTI UNQUOTE VIRUS GOES BEYOND RITUAL REVOLUTIONARY STRAIN, AND WHILE MAJORITY OF IRANIANS IGNORE IT, PROPAGANDA EFFORT IS BEGINNING TO HAVE CUMULATIVE EFFECT, ESPECIALLY ON THE YOUNG. U.S. SHOULD FOREBEAR FOR NOW. END SUMMARY.

3. EMBASSY DOES NOT WISH TO BELABOR SUBJECT, BUT DOES WISH TO ACQUAINT ADDRESSEES WITH SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN ANTI-AMERICANISM WHICH AS TAKEN PLACE BEGINNING ABOUT APRIL 1 AND INCREASING PARTICULARLY OVER PAST FOUR DAYS. THIS HEIGHTENED ANTI-YANKEE EFFORT HAS AN ALMOST THIRD-WORLD QUALITY ABOUT IT. STEMMING DIRECTLY FROM THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND THE PERSONAL PREDILECTIONS OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AND SOME OF HIS CLOSE SUPPORTERS ON ONE HAND, AND VARIOUS LEFTIST GROUPS, INCLUDING THE PLO-INFLUENCED FEDAYEEN, ON THE OTHER.

4. VISIBLE MANIFESTATIONS HAVE BEEN GROWING ANTI-AMERICAN COMMENT IN PERSIAN PRESS (THE ONLY PRINT MEDIA LEFT SINCE CESSATION OF ALL FOREIGN LANGUAGE PAPERS MARCH 27), THE EXTENSIVE USE OF SOVIET AND OTHER BLOC MATERIALS ON TELEVISION, AND THE REVELATIONS AT RECENT TRIALS BY OFFICIALS WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WITH THE CIA OR GENERAL HUYSER (DEPT. NEA/IRN SEE IRAN POOL REPORTS FOR APRIL 14-17, BEING FORWARDED BY POUCH). GENERALS RABII AND BERENJIAN REFERRED TO U.S. GENERAL HUYSER'S MISSION AND QUOTE U.S. SPY BASES UNQUOTE AT THEIR TRIALS. UNFLATTERING COVERAGE OF THEIR TESTIMONY APPEARED BOTH IN THE PRESS AND ON T.V. EMBASSY'S SENIOR ECONOMIC LOCAL WAS KICKED OUT OF CENTRAL BANK DURING ROUTINE VISIT APRIL 9 AND SIGNS WERE QUICKLY POSTED, QUOTE WE HAVE REMOVED THE IMPERIALIST AGENT. UNQUOTE. SENIOR ICA LOCAL REMAINS IN CUSTODY OF TEHRAN KHOMEINI COMMITTEE ON NEBULOUS CHARGES SUPPOSEDLY RELATING TO EMBASSY WORK. PRIVATE SECTOR AMCITS WHO REMAIN, AS WELL AS EUROPEANS, REPORT THEY ARE STARED AT (AND SHOUTED AT) ON STREETS WITH MUCH MORE HOSTILITY THAN A MONTH AGO.

5. KHOMEINI HIMSELF, IN ADDRESSING REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS IN QOM ON APRIL 16, CALLED AGAIN FOR QUOTE CUTTING OFF THE HANDS OF THE AMERICANS WHO DO THE WORK OF THE DEVIL UNQUOTE (ETTELA'AT BANNER HEADLINE). THOSE WHO KNOW KHOMEINI, EVEN HIS MORE MODERNIZED ASSOCIATES, SAY HE IS VIRTUALLY PARANOID ABOUT THE U.S., BLAMING AMERICA FOR MOST OF THE ILLS OF THE SHAH YEARS. IT IS CLEAR FROM HIS PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS AND ACTIONS THAT THE AYATOLLAH WANTS TO

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STAMP OUT THE LAST VESTIGES OF U.S. INFLUENCE IN IRAN. ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COURT INTERROGATORS AND JUDGES CONTINUALLY PUSH WITNESSES TO DESCRIBE THEIR TIES TO QUOTE WESTERN IMPERIALISM, UNQUOTE OR SEEK LINKAGES BETWEEN THE OLD REGIME AND THE CIA OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS (ROTARY INTERNATIONAL, THE FREEMASONS, ETC) WHICH COULD BE USED TO TAR THE U.S.

6. SEVERAL UNIVERSITY SOURCES WHO WERE RELATIVELY RELAXED FIVE WEEKS AGO NOW REPORT THAT SEVERAL OF THEIR US EDUCATED COLLEAGUES HAVE BEEN PICKED UP ON THE STREETS WITHOUT WARNING. IN SOME CASES, THEY HAVE BEEN BROUGHT BEFORE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES AND IN ONE CASE, A LOWER LEVEL COURT, ON CHARGES OF QUOTE HELPING THE AMERICANS UNQUOTE (THIS IS APPARENTLY BECOMING A CRIME, OR AT LEAST A GREY ACT, IN REVOLUTIONARY IRAN). ONE CONTACT AND CLOSE FRIEND OF RICHARD COTTAM INDICATED TO EMBOFF THAT NUMBER OF ACADEMICS ARE NOW IN JAIL WITHOUT CHARGES AND SAID IT WAS BETTER EMBOFFS NOT RPT NOT TRY TO CONTACT THEIR ACADEMIC FRIENDS DIRECTLY BECAUSE THIS COULD BE QUOTE MISCONSTRUED UNQUOTE. NUMBER OF OTHER NON-ACADEMIC CONTACTS OF EMBOFFS HAVE SIMILARLY RELUCTANT TO MEET IN PUBLIC PLACES AND*** SEVERAL ARE RELUCTANT TO MEET AT*** HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY RELUCTANT TO MEET IN PUBLIC PLACES AND SEVERAL ARE RELUCTANT TO MEET AT ALL, QUOTE UNTIL THINGS SETTLE DOWN UNQUOTE. PRESS OFFICER HAS ENCOUNTERED SIMILAR PROBLEMS WITH GREAT NUMBER OF JOURNALISTS. ATMOSPHERE IS SIGNIFICANTLY TIGHTER IN THIS REGARD THAN ~~WHEN~~ IT WAS TWO WEEKS AGO.

7. INDIVIDUALS WE KNOW WHO ARE CONNECTED IN ANY WAY WITH FEDAYEEN AND OTHER LEFTISTS GROUPS INDICATED THAT ANTI-AMERICAN EFFORT HAS LEFT'S FULL BLESSING AND HELP AS WELL. PLO REPRESENTATIVE HERE HAS PUBLICLY ATTACKED MID EAST PEACE EFFORT AND U.S., AND HAVE PUSHED USE OF WORDS SUCH AS IMPERIALISM AND ANTI-COLONIALISM IN SPEECHES AND ELSEWHERE. IF ONE BELIEVES SOME ELEMENTS OF LEFT, IRANIAN REVOLUTION WAS CARRIED OUT SOLELY TO SHAKE OFF COLONIAL SHACKLES OF U.S. IMPERIALISM, WHICH HAS DEVIOUS PLOT FOR WHOLE AREA. SOVIET RADIO BROADCASTS ALSO TAKE SAME THEME, BUT WE BELIEVE IRANIAN RESPOND MORE TO PLO'S THIRD WORLD STYLE. ABOVE IS AIDED BY PERSIAN PENCHANT FOR FINDING PLOTS IN EVERY POLITICAL SITUATION: A COMMON STORY MAKING ROUNDS OF EDUCATED CIRCLES IN IRAN GOES LIKE THIS: THE U.S. DECIDED TO BACK KHOMEINI AS THE BEST

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BULWARK AGAINST COMMUNISM. IF THIS IS NOT TRUE, WHY DIDN'T CIA ASSASSINATE KHOMEINI WHEN IT HAD A CHANCE? AMERICAN INFLUENCE IN IRAN IS THEREFORE BOTH STRONGER AND MORE SUBTLE THAN EVER BEFORE. CONCLUSION, DEPENDING ON ONE'S VIEWS, IS THAT ONE SHOULD (A) GO ALONG WITH SUPER-POWER EFFORT TO STABILIZE IRAN OR (B) WORK ALL THE HARDER TO ROOT OUT PERNICIOUS WESTERN VALUES AND U.S. IMPERIALISM.

8. ABOVE OFFERED TO SHOW LENGTHS EVEN ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARIES WILL OCCASIONALLY GO TO AVOID TAKING CREDIT FOR THEIR OWN ACHIEVEMENTS. BULK OF IRANIAN POPULACE, AT LEAST IN TEHRAN HAS THUS FAR NOT BEEN REALLY AFFECTED BY CAMPAIGN BUT CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THIS PROPAGANDA EFFORT CAN NOT BE IGNORED, ESPECIALLY ON HIGH SCHOOL AND COLLEGE STUDENTS WHO HAVE LITTLE TO COMPARE IT WITH, AND NO HISTORICAL RESIDUE OF POSITIVE EXPERIENCE.

9. WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT? MISSION IS IN DAMNED-IF-WE-DO-DAMNED-IF-WE-DON'T POSITION AND TO SOME DEGREE, SO IS USG GENERALLY. THE LOWER OUR PROFILE CAN BE KEPT, THE BETTER, AND A SUBSTANTIAL DOSE OF FOREBEARANCE WOULD SEEM TO BE THE ORDER OF THE DAY. THIS COUPLED WITH SOME PATIENT QUIET DIPLOMACY WITH INDIVIDUAL LEADERS, MAY OVER TIME REDUCE THE STRIDENCY. ARRIVAL OF NEW AMBASSADOR WILL PROBABLY BE FIRST REALLY GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE POSITIVE PROJECTION TO UNDERCUT ANTI-AMERICAN CAMPAIGN WITHOUT MAKING SITUATION WORSE. NAAS##

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STATE
CHG: CWNAAS
POL: JSTEMPEL
POL: METRINKO, GARRETT, ECON: BASH, TAYLOR, MAAG: GAST

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

INFO: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USLO RIYADH
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
USDOCOSOUTH

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 4/21/99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PINS, PORS, IR
SUBJ: LOOKING AHEAD: THE BEDROCK PROBLEMS; PART I

REF: A) TEHRAN 4025 NOTAL; B) TEHRAN 2583 NOTAL;
C) TEHRAN 2681 NOTAL; D) TEHRAN 4138 NOTAL

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: FIRST BLUSH OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IS OVER AND WE ARE IN A BETTER POSITION TO SUGGEST OUTLINE OF FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS TO BE CONTENDED WITH IN THE FUTURE. BASIC QUESTIONS OF LEGITIMACY, AUTHORITY, ALLOCATION OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF POWER ARE AT ISSUE. FROM A UNITARY MONARCHY WHICH MADE IRAN APPEAR MORE UNIFIED THAN IT WAS AND IS, THE COUNTRY IS NOW HIGHLY FRAGMENTED IN TERMS OF POWER SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC VALUES AND ORGANIZATION. THOSE SEEKING POWER WILL HAVE TO ESTABLISH LEGITIMACY, ORGANIZE THEMSELVES TO PULL INTERESTS TOGETHER FOR SOME UNITY OF PURPOSE, BUILD A POWER BASE. THEY WILL HAVE TO EITHER DEVELOP AND CARRY OUT POLICIES TO FULFILL THE VALUE EXPECTATIONS OF PEOPLE WHO THEMSELVES ARE SHARPLY DIVIDED ABOUT WHAT THEY WANT, OR ATTEMPT TO ALTER EXPECTATIONS, PERHAPS WITH INTIMIDATION AND TERROR. END SUMMARY.

3. ANALYSING BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE OF A REVOLUTION RESEMBLES BUILDING A SKYSCRAPER ON QUICKSAND. NEVERTHELESS, THE FIRST BLUSH OF IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IS PAST AND IT IS POSSIBLE TO IDENTIFY SOME VERY FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS WHICH ANY REGIME OR GROUP WHICH SEEKS POWER WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH. THIS CABLE ATTEMPTS TO IDENTIFY THE MAJOR PROBLEMS AND EXPLORE THEIR PARAMETERS, OUTLINE THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY, AND OFFER A FEW TENTATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON HOW THE MAJOR PIECES RELATE AT THE MOMENT.

4. IRAN'S REVOLUTION, STEMMING ROUGHLY FROM SEPTEMBER 1977 TO THE PRESENT, SAW THE PROGRESSIVE EROSION OF LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY TO A POINT WHICH IS UNBELIEVABLE TO THOSE WHO KNEW IRAN PREVIOUSLY. THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY ENFORCED A DECEPTIVE UNITY OF BOTH VALUES AND ORGANIZATION IN THE COUNTRY; IN THIS SENSE IT WAS NOT DISSIMILAR TO THE STRONG DYNASTIES IN THE PAST. THE PROGRESSIVE DISMANTLING OF PAHLAVI RULE, BEGINNING WITH DEMONSTRATIONS IN QOM IN JANUARY 1978 FOLLOWED BY LOW LEVEL UNREST LEADING TO THE SEPT. JALEH SQUARE SHOOTINGS AND TO THE CHALLENGES OF GENERAL STRIKES AND STREET MOBS IN NOV. 1978 - FEB 1979 HAS VIRTUALLY PUT AN END TO ANY UNIFIED SENSE OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY. THE VICTORY OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT HAS NOT CHANGED THIS SITUATION; IN ADDITION TO THE PARALLEL GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE (REF A) OF THE BAZARGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE KHOMEINI COMMITTEES AND FRICTION WITHIN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND OTHER GROUPS IN SOCIETY, ON ALL MAJOR ISSUES. THE SHAH'S DEPARTURE REMOVED THE ONE

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ELEMENT ON WHICH THERE WAS A GENERAL CONSENSUS BY LATE FALL OR EARLY WINTER OF 1978.

5. EROSION OF LEGITIMACY HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED (AND PUSHED ALONG) BY THE PUBLIC SURFACING OF DEEP DIVISION OVER BASIC VALUES (REF B AND C). PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE VALUE SPLITS ARE THOSE BETWEEN SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS. MANY WHO GREATLY AIDED THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT'S VICTORY OVER THE SHAH ARE UNWILLING TO SETTLE FOR AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AND FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAMIC LIMITATIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND SOCIAL LIFE. SOME RELIGIOUS LEADERS THEMSELVES (TALEQANI, SHARIAT-MADARI) DO NOT SUPPORT KHOMEINI AS FIRMLY NOW AS THEY APPEARED TO DO IN THE FIGHTING PHASE OF THE REVOLUTION. VICTORY OVER THE MONARCHY LED QUICKLY TO RUPTURE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COALITION. THE PUBLIC EMERGENCE IN THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS OF THE MARXIST FEDAYEEN AND THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT (NDF) AS POTENTIALLY CONSEQUENTIAL FORCES ARE INDICATIONS OF THIS SPLIT.

6. THESE VALUE DIVISIONS CUT ACROSS POLITICAL, CLASS AND AGE GROUP LINES. ARGUMENTS BETWEEN THOSE WHO FAVOR THE CONCEPT OF A MODERN, WESTERNIZED SOCIETY TAKE PLACE IN BOTH RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR CAMPS, THOUGH THE WEIGHT OF THE MODERNIST GROUP IS GENERALLY AMONG THE SECULARISTS, JUST AS THE BULK OF THE TRADITIONALISTS ARE SOLIDLY BEHIND KHOMEINI. THE YOUNG SEEK PARTICIPATION, SOMETIMES OPTING FOR THE LEFT, SOMETIMES FOR THE RELIGIOUS SIDE OF THE POLITICAL FENCE. THEIR ELDERLY TEND TO BE WARY OF REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR AND EXCESS, WHILE THOSE IN THEIR 20'S SUPPORT SUMMARY EXECUTIONS IN THE NAME OF REVOLUTION. SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF SUPPORTERS OF THE OLD REGIME EXIST; FOR THE MOMENT THEY ARE COWED, BUT THEY MAY NOT REMAIN SO (GEN QARANI'S ASSASSINATION SUGGESTS THEY MAY HAVE STARTED). FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE PROVINCES WE UNDERSTAND THERE IS MUCH GREATER EVIDENCE OF ACTIVITY BY SHAH SUPPORTERS.

7. THE BASIC IMPACT ON THE BODY POLITIC TO THIS POINT HAS BEEN AN UPLIFTING AND WIDESPREAD SENSE OF FREEDOM -- POLITICAL DEBATE RAGES ON EVERY STREETCORNER AND IN EVERY CLASSROOM. THE SCENE IS A DAZZLING ONE, THOROUGHLY ENJOYED BY EVERYONE. PROBLEMS CREEP IN WHEN EFFORTS ARE MADE, OR ARE SEEN TO BE NECESSARY, TO ESTABLISH LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEALING WITH SERIOUS

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DIFFICULTIES. MOVEMENT OFF THE PRESENT CENTER OF LOOSE FREEDOM REQUIRES ACTION TAKEN IN THE NAME OF LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, WITH THE ULTIMATE SANCTION OF FORCE. NO ONE CAN YET DO THIS. THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT'S DIFFICULTIES CAN BE SHOWN BY TWO EXAMPLES: IN THE CASE OF THE ARMED UNITS LOYAL TO THE REVOLUTION, THEIR WILLINGNESS TO OBEY ORDERS TO FIRE DEPENDS UPON THE SITUATION. THERE HAVE BEEN AT LEAST THREE SITUATIONS IN WHICH REVOLUTIONARY TROOPS (MUJAHIDDIN) HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO FIRE ON DEMONSTRATORS AND REFUSED. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE REGULAR ARMED FORCES HAS NOT PROCEEDED TO THE POINT WHERE THEY CAN BE USED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF CIVIL ORDER, EXCEPT IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH AS THE KURDISH AND TURKOMAN MINI-REVOLTS. IN BOTH INSTANCES, THE SITUATION HAS BEEN TOUCH AND GO. RECENT FIGHTING IN NAGHADEH, WHERE PGOI FORCES WERE UNABLE TO ENTER THE CITY UNTIL A VERY SHAKY CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN ARRANGED IS A CASE IN POINT.

8. EXAMPLE TWO: THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION ILLUSTRATES THE PGOI'S EFFORTS TO COPE WITH WIDE DIFFERENCES OVER VALUES. A CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE IS NOW TRYING TO HARMONIZE A DRAFT WRITTEN BY SECULAR-MINDED LAWYERS WITH ONE WRITTEN BY A TEAM OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS. THE TWO ARE FAR APART ON SUCH CENTRAL POINTS AS WHO SHALL EXERCISE SUPREME EXECUTIVE POWER, RELATIONS BETWEEN BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT, THE FUNDAMENTAL SOURCE FOR LAWS, AND WHAT KIND OF HUMAN RIGHTS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. THESE QUESTIONS INVOLVE MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VALUES. IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER SUCH DEEP VALUE DIVERGENCES CAN BE RESOLVED IN A DEMOCRATIC CONTEXT OF COMPROMISE AND BROKERING. ANY GOVERNMENT TRYING TO GOVERN IRAN WILL BE FACED WITH A SIMILAR PROBLEM. ANY MOVEMENT WHICH WANTS TO PLAY A ROLE IN POLITICAL LIFE MUST COPE WITH THIS DEEPLY SEATED SPLIT OVER VALUES AND EITHER USE FORCE EFFECTIVELY, COMPROMISE, OR FAIL. THE EXTREME INDIVIDUALISM AND SELF-CENTEREDNESS OF PERSIANS MAKE COMPROMISE DIFFICULT.

9. THE BRIDGE BETWEEN LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY IN IRAN TODAY IS FOUND IN THE CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI, BUT SUPPORTS FOR THIS BRIDGE ARE ERODING AND THE REFERENDUM IS NOT VIEWED BY MOST ASSANCTIONING HIS LEGITIMACY. KHOMEINI'S CHARISMA AND UNCOMPROMISING HOSTILITY TOWARD THE SHAH MADE HIM THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT LEADER IN IRAN. BUT HE IS NOT UNIVERSALLY LOVED AND GROUPS EVEN NOW ARE STARTING TO MOVE AGAINST HIM,

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HOWEVER OBLIQUELY (SOME DIRECTLY -- WITH QUOTE DEATH TO KHOMEINI UNQUOTE CHANTS). KHOMEINI'S PROBLEM IS AUTHORITY. BECAUSE THERE IS NO UNIVERSALLY AGREED INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF LEGITIMACY IN IRAN, THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT (PGOI) IS NOT RPT NOT THE EXCLUSIVE REPOSITORY OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY. IT SHARES THIS ROLE (AND IS THE VERY JUNIOR PARTNER ON IMPORTANT QUESTIONS) WITH THE COMMITTEE STRUCTURE CREATED BY KHOMEINI. KHOMEINI IN GOOD SHIITE ANTI-AUTHORITARIAN TRADITION, HAS ATTACKED HIS OWN GOVERNMENT ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION. THE TENSION BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN AND THE GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMITTEE STRUCTURE IS SUBSTANTIAL AND VISIBLE. IT FREQUENTLY LEAVES THE IRANIAN PEOPLE MYSTIFIED ABOUT THE TRUE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY. THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT BELIEVED THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY WOULD DISAPPEAR ONCE IT HAD WON THE REVOLUTION. IT IS NOW CLEAR TO ALL IN IRAN THAT IT REMAINS CRUCIAL TO THE QUESTION OF WHO ULTIMATELY CONTROLS THE REVOLUTION. NO OTHER GROUP BESIDES THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT CAN MAKE A CLAIM WHICH WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO AS MANY PEOPLE, BUT THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO IMPOSE ITS WILL ON THE NATION IN WAYS THAT OFFER PROSPECTS OF LONG TERM STABILITY. IRANIAN WOMEN, FOR EXAMPLE, REBELLED SUCCESSFULLY IN THE STREETS AGAINST KHOMEINI'S INJUNCTIONS ON DRESS, ETC.

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10. WHICH BRINGS UP THE QUESTION OF POWER--POWER TO INSURE OBEDIENCE, MILITARY POWER TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY AND THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE ABILITY TO ORDER THINGS DONE WITH A REASONABLE EXPECTATION THAT THEY WILL BE DONE. IF THERE IS NO VALUE CONSENSUS, THEN QUESTIONS OF FORCE BECOME DOUBLY IMPORTANT--CAN ONE OF THE CONTENDERS IMPOSE ITS WILL ON ALL OTHERS? THE UNIQUE FEATURE OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION TO DATE HAS BEEN THAT IT ENCOMPASSED VIRTUALLY COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF ALL EXISTING CENTERS OF POWER--ARMY, AIR FORCE, SAVAK, POLICE, GENDARMERIE--WITHOUT THUS FAR CREATING NEW NUCLEUS OF PHYSICAL POWER WHICH IS CENTRALLY CONTROLLED. THE MUJAHIDDIN ARE PROBABLE THE MAJOR FORCE IN COUNTRY AT MOMENT, BUT EXTREMELY WEAK WHEN LAID OUT ON A NATIONAL-SIZE CANVAS, AND DEEPLY DIVIDED WITHIN BETWEEN FAVORED PRO-KHOMEINI FUNDAMENTALISTS AND THOSE WHO ARE WILLING TO WORK WITH THE FEDAYEEN TO CONTINUE THE REVOLUTION. MARXIST: FEDAYEEN, AS RESULT OF WEAPONS ACQUISITION DURING FEB 10-14 DESTRUCTION OF OLD REGIME, HAVE COME UP FAST, BUT REMAIN SMALL GROUPS CENTERED IN CITIES. RANDOM GROUPS, INCLUDING SOME RIGHTIST OUTFITS, ALSO HAVE WEAPONS. NEW SCHEME WILL BE CREATED BY LEFT AND RIGHT IN AN EFFORT TO COUNTER-BALANCE ONE ANOTHER. PHYSICAL POWER CONFIGURATION IS THUS EXTREMELY DIFFUSE.

11. POLITICAL POWER IS LESS DIFFUSE FOR THE PRESENT, AND HERE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT DOMINATES SCENE, WITH MOSQUE COMMITTEES IN VIRTUALLY EVERY LOCATIONS. LOYALTY OF ALL THESE UNITS IS THEORETICALLY TO KHOMEINI, BUT AS TALEGHANI INCIDENT (REF D) SHOWED CLEARLY, ATTACHMENTS MAY SHIFT AROUND, AND RELATIVELY MINOR INCIDENTS MAY HAVE SERIOUS ORGANIZATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS. POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE RELATIVELY WEAK IN ANY CASE. IT IS HARD TO UNDERESTIMATE THE BREAKDOWN IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF ALL KINDS AND THE LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL BONDS OF ANY KIND. IRAN HAS NEVER HAD STRONG POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS; THE PGOI IS BENT ON ERASING THOSE WHICH HAVE EXISTED, AND NEW ONES HAVE NOT BEEN DEVELOPED. WE ARE WATCHING THE BIRTH OF A NEW SYSTEM IN ITS TRUEST SENSE, FROM THE BANKS TO THE UNIVERSITIES. PURGE AND INEXPERIENCE ARE THE ORDER OF THE DAY. THE MEDIA, WHILE OSTENSIBLY PRO-KHOMEINI, IS IN FACT LEFT-LEANING AT THE MOMENT.

12. THE FIRST ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF ANYONE ASPIRING TO POWER MUST BE TO BUILD OR CAPTURE POLITICAL LOYALTY IN

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AN ORGANIZED FRAMEWORK. GROUPS WHICH SPAN THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM ARE HARD AT WORK ON THIS. FOR THE MOMENT, THE LEFT IS DOING A SLIGHTLY BETTER JOB, BUT IT WILL BE WEEKS, IF NOT MONTHS, UNTIL IT ACHIEVES ANYTHING LIKE COMPETITIVE PARITY (SIGNIFICANT NUMERICAL MINORITY POSITION) WITH THE RELIGIOUS FORCES (AND ONLY THEN IF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT MAKES A HASH OF ITS OWN ORGANIZATIONAL TASK). JOKER IN THIS EQUATION, HOWEVER, MIGHT BE ALLIANCES BETWEEN MARXIST FEDAYEEN AND TRIBAL GROUPS SUCH AS KURDS OR TURKOMANS OR WITH DISENCHANTED CENTRISTS. THIS COULD ADVANCE TIMETABLE A BIT AND, IN THE ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT INTERNAL DIPLOMACY, COULD BRING IRAN TO THE POINT OF POLITICAL CONFLICT SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. IN THE ABSENCE OF A SOLIDLY LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT ON A FIRM POWER BASE, SUCH CHALLENGE WILL SURELY COME. IN ADDITION TO THE TRADITIONAL IRANIAN ISSUES OF TRIBALISM, SEPARATISM AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICT BETWEEN SHIA AND SUINI, WHOEVER ATTEMPTS TO BUILD POWER IN IRAN WILL BE FACED WITH SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEM IN AREA OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT/VALUE EXPECTATIONS. REVOLUTION HAS RAISED PEOPLES' EXPECTATIONS TO VERY HIGH LEVELS, ESPECIALLY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR. POOR HAVE BEEN PROMISED JOBS, HOUSING, AMPLE FOOD BUT ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IS ALSO PREACHING AUSTERE LIVING. YET, HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF IRANIANS ENJOYED THE ECONOMIC BOOM AND ARE HIGHLY CONSUMPTION ORIENTED. COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM IS LIMPING ALONG, GRADUALLY TRYING TO RECOVER PRODUCTION AMIDST WAGE CLAIMS, COMMITTEE ORDERS TO HALT, THEN RESUME PRODUCTION, AND DIFFICULTIES WITH BANKING SYSTEM AND LEGAL STRUCTURE COMPLICATED BY REVOLUTIONARY REDISTRIBUTION OF GOODS BY COURTS AND COMMITTEES. SUCCESSFUL POWER ASPIRANTS WILL HAVE TO DEVELOP AND CARRY OUT PROGRAMS TO MEET (OR REDUCE) VALUE EXPECTATIONS WHICH ARE WIDELY DIVERGENT. THEY WILL HAVE TO ARTICULATE AND ORGANIZE INTERESTS AND COMBINE THESE INTO MEANINGFUL PROGRAM TO MEET NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS. SHAH'S REGIME NEVER SUCCEEDED IN DOING THAT AT THE HEIGHT OF ITS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, AND IT HAD A GOOD DEAL MORE FORCE AT ITS DISPOSAL TO HANDLE RESULTANT UNREST WHICH WAS CREATED THAN ANY SUCCESSOR GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO HAVE FOR A LONG TIME TO COME. CONDITION OF THE ECONOMY THEN, IS THE POTENTIAL BOMB WHICH ANY REGIME THAT SEEKS POWER MUST DEFUSE. FAILURE TO DEAL WITH THE

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SUBSTANTIAL UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM, ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT CONSUMER SPENDING IN THE NAME OF ISLAM, OR COLLECTIVIST PROPOSALS WHICH GO AGAINST THE GRAIN OF ROUGHSHOD IRANIAN INDIVIDUALISM WILL BE INVITATIONS TO CONTINUED POLITICAL CHAOS. A GOVERNMENT WHICH CAN BRING ANY OF THESE PROBLEMS STEPS NEAR SOLUTION WILL ACQUIRE MORE VOLUNTARY SUPPORT AND NEED LESS COERCIVE MACHINERY. NAAS##

C/79-5

Original

THE REVIVAL OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM: THE CASE OF IRAN

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THE REVIVAL OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM: THE CASE OF IRAN

William E. Griffith

The Iranian revolution has highlighted one of the principal religious and political developments of our time, the revival of Islamic fundamentalism, from Indonesia to Morocco and from Turkey to central Africa.¹ In the short run it will cause more problems to the West. In the long run, however, it may be more dangerous to the Soviet Union in Muslim Soviet Central Asia.²

The western model of modernization, industrialization, and rational bureaucracy, of an agnostic intelligentsia and consumerist masses, has had

¹O.G.R., "Grollender Islam in Indonesien," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, April 27, 1978; Hd., "Islamische Aufbruchstimmung in Malaysien," ibid., Feb. 22, 1979; Gérard Viratelle, "La révolution afghane à l'épreuve de l'Islam III. La révolte des religieux," Le Monde, March 22, 1979; for Egypt, the regular coverage by J.C. Peroncel-Hugoz from Cairo in ibid.; for Pakistan, Dieter H. Khalid, "The Phenomenon of Re-Islamization," Aussenpolitik, Engl. ed., no. 4, 1978; Fu'ad Matar, "Cover Story: From the Gulf to the Atlantic--the Egyptian Rejection," Al-Mustaqbal (Paris), Oct. 21, 1978 (JPRS 72491, Dec. 21, 1978), and "After Expanding Circle of Opposition, al-Sadat Breaks Truce with Muslim Brotherhood," Al-Dustur (London), Oct. 30, 1978 (ibid.).

²For background, see Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). The authors point out the similarities between the national communist views of Sultan Galiev, its principal representative, and Tan Malaka, M.N. Roy, Ben Bella (explicitly), and Jose Carlos Mariategui. There are considerable similarities to 'Alī Shari'ati as well. See also Bennigsen, "Muslim Conservative Opposition to the Soviet Regime: The Sufi Brotherhoods in the North Caucasus," in Jeremy Azrael, ed., Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 334-348.

some notable non-western successes: Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. But all these have been in the Sinic Confucian cultural area, characterized by unbroken, proud culture and a system of ethics rather than revealed religion. Even so, in China itself three great convulsions, the T'ai-p'ing and Boxer Rebellions and the Cultural Revolution, have shown that the result of China's current attempt to shift back to modernization must remain in doubt.

For the rest of the underdeveloped world western-style modernization is attractive and alienating, sought after and rejected, admired and hated. Most of the third world admires some of its results: affluence, upward social mobility, technological progress, and therefore assured national independence. It rejects others: agnosticism, corruption, materialism, amorality, ruthless competition, and technocracy. The more rapid, corrupt, and inegalitarian, especially in major cities, modernization is, the more violent is its rejection.

The revolts against western-style modernization have usually included the renaissance of religion and community (Gemeinschaft), of tradition and group cohesion, against what Max Weber called the "demystification of the age" (die Entzauberung der Zeit). It looks for renewed community and for charismatic leaders. It is passionate, puritanical, and in the literal sense reactionary, for it seeks to return to and embrace the roots of the tranquil past in order to overcome the alienation and anxiety of the unsettling present.

The revolt against western-style modernization is today especially strong in the Islamic world. Islam is much more than a religion; it is

also an all-embracing system of social and political order, embodied in the code of law and contained in the Qu'ran and the Shariya. Islam is universal and central in the life of Muslims. Its traditions are communitarian and egalitarian and it puts strong emphasis on social justice. It encompasses and molds the totality of one's life from birth to death, as an individual and a member of every social group, from the family to the nation. (Indeed, the community of Islam (umma) is so all-embracing that the nation-state concept in the Islamic world is weak in comparison.) It knows neither the idea of progress nor any distinction between God and Caesar, church and state, for Muhammad was a secular as well as a religious ruler, and so were his successors the Caliphs and (for Shi'i Muslims, the Imams.) Islam, therefore, is the more challenged by western modernity.

There have been recurrent waves of Islamic fundamentalism: the Wahhabi sect in eighteenth-century Arabia (of which the Saudi ruling family are now the chief representatives), the Senussi in Libya, and the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslīmūn) in Egypt in the late 1920s and since. More recently, Middle Eastern attempts to combine Islam with western-style, frequently "socialist" modernization, such as Nasr's "Arab socialism,"³ are now seen, even by many of their earlier proponents, to have largely failed. Conversely, Israel has been seen by many if not most Arabs not only as non-Muslim, that is, a representative of a tolerated but inferior religion, but its victories are seen as those of a western state led by an irreligious

³ See the recent devastating analysis by P.J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation (New York: St. Martin's, 1978.)

western elite. Finally, oil-rich Saudi Arabia and Libya have been heavily financing Islamic fundamentalist propaganda. They have thereby intensified, although certainly not created, its appeal.

For all these reasons, Islam is now once again summoning up all its force and passion in response, including the Islamic traditions of revulsion against corruption and revolt against unjust and irreligious rulers.⁴

The Ideological Background of Islamic Radicalism in Iran

Uniquely among Middle Eastern countries, Iran has two major political traditions, antique Persian kingship and Shi'ī Islam. Shi'ī has more potential for revolt against secular authority than Sunni Islam, going back to the killing in the seventh century battle of Karbalā' of the third Imam, Husayn, son of 'Alī (the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad and the founder of Shi'ī Islam) by the Sunni Caliph Yazīd, which became the archetype of the defeat of justice by a tyrant. (The Shah was often known as "the Yazīd of the age" and one of the greatest 1978 demonstrations against him was on the anniversary of this event.) In 874, according to "Twelver" (Ithnā 'Asharī) Shi'ī tradition, the

⁴ The above is largely based on conversations with Sadiq el-Mahdi in Khartoum and Soedjatmoko at the IISS meeting in Oxford in Aug. and Sept. 1978 respectively. I have also profited from Bernard Lewis, Islam in History (N.Y.: Library Press, 1973), pp. 235, 245, 293-302 and "The Return of Islam," Commentary, Jan. 1976; Marshall Hodgson, The New Venture of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), vol. 3, pp. 417-441 and the review of it by Clifford Geertz in the New York Review of Books, Dec. 11, 1975; "There is but one God," The Economist, Sept. 9, 1978; Fouad Ajami, "Iran: Islam's Ruminations," The New York Times, Nov. 15, 1978; "The soldiers of Allah advance," The Economist, Jan. 27, 1979; and especially Maxime Rodinson, "Reveil de l'intégrisme musulman?," Le Monde, Dec. 6, 7, 8, 1978, A.H. [Arnold Hottel], "Tradition als Zuflucht der muslimischen Völker," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nov. 5-6, 1978, and Detlev H. Khalid, "The Phenomenon of Re-Islamization," *op. cit.*

twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdī, disappeared, i.e., he went into "occultation." Since then, therefore, all secular authority has been illegitimate or at least inferior in legitimacy to the authority, secular as well as religious, of the mujtahids (the leading religious authorities, now normally the āyatullāhs), to whom imitation (taghlīd) is owed. Moreover, frequently a single mujtahid has often been recognized as the main source of imitation (marja'-i taghlīd), just as the Āyatullah Khumeynī is now.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, out of nationalist, anti-Ottoman motives, the Safavid dynasty made Shī'ī Islam the state religion of Iran. Thereafter, the ulamā were able to institutionalize their positions far more than in Sunni Islam. Shī'ism is millenarian, elitist, and distinguishes sharply between good and evil. While the Shī'ī ulamā were theologically static, Shī'ī and Ṣūfī mystics and philosophers, notably Mullā Sadrā (d. 1640), usually held that some exceptional thinkers ('awliya) can and must mystically interpret the Imam's views and thereby move toward perfection even during the age of occultation. They believed that their views, those of the small elite of "perfect men" (i.e., neo-Platonic philosopher-kings or Ṣūfī master initiators of esoteric truth) were superior not only to secular rulers but also to the mujtahids. Not surprisingly, all these heterodox views were condemned by the ulamā.

The Shī'ī doctrine of occultation produced a series of Iranian millenarian movements which combined religious mysticism and opposition to the central government, the best known of which are the Ismailis and the Shaikhis. The latter were, however, essentially medieval, i.e., they were in the current of Islamic intellectual dissent, not of the modern ideas of

individual and social progress, but one of their later leaders, Hajj Muhammad Karīm Khān Kirmānī, did add the concept of social evolution, under an elitist leadership, to Shaikhi thought. A more socially radical version was that of nineteenth century Babism (the predecessor of Bahā'ī.)

Modern Iranian political activism has been twice ambivalent: for modernization but against western domination, and split between adherence to Shi'ī Islam and Iran's pre-Islamic heritage. Several combinations emerged (1) Islamic reformers: those who tried genuinely to combine Shi'ī Islam with the technological aspects of modernization; (2) westernizing modernists who, while not rejecting Islam, emphasized a combination of Iran's pre-Islamic past and the technology of modernization (these would include the Shah and his father); and (3) modernizers who professed to be Muslims but were primarily concerned with adjusting it to social change (e.g., Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn "al-Afghānī" and Mīrzā Malkūm Khān). Primarily influenced by the Enlightenment, they were also affected by Shaikhi and Babi thought. They continued neo-Platonist and elitist aspects of heterodox Shi'ī thought and most of them also stressed Iranian nationalism.

All three categories opposed the Qajar dynasty's centralizing policies and so did the traditionalist ulamā and their bazari merchant allies, who also opposed the Qajars' westernizing tendencies. Thus was the alliance of convenience forged between the westernizing intellectuals and the ulamā. This alliance sparked the tobacco rebellions at the end of the nineteenth century and the 1905-1911 constitutional crisis. In 1906 the constitution gave the senior ulamā a veto over legislation--a provision the Āyatullāh Khomeynī has revived today. Moreover, by the nineteenth century the most senior

āyatullahs normally lived outside Iran, at the holiest Shi'ī cities in Iraq, Najaf and Karbalā', primarily in order to be independent from the Qajars. The Āyatullah Khumeynī's exile since 1963, first in Iraq and then in Paris, was therefore made entirely legitimate by Shi'ī tradition. Khumeynī was exiled in 1963 for his protests against the Shah's autocratic rule, and his close ties with the United States and Israel⁵--the same protests he made in 1978-1979 and very similar to those made by Āyatullah Kāshānī in the Musaddiq period and by the ulamā in the 1905 constitutional movement.

Modern Iranian political activism has thus been westernizing and traditional, religious and national, pre-Islamic Persian and Islamic. It has been largely characterized by, and cannot be understood without, the principal ideas of previous Shi'ī heterodox philosophy: millenarianism, perfectionism, elitism, and dissimulation (taqiyyeh). Even its most westernizing proponents have been intellectual elitists, despairing of democracy in an illiterate, underdeveloped society. Usually despairing of success on a non-Islamic platform, they have therefore dissimulated their real aims or at least (as historically so often in Islam) "reinterpreted" Islam radically. Others, anti-western, insisted on adherence to traditionalist Islam, with varying degrees of reinterpretation.

⁵For Khumaynī's views then and later, see his Islamic Government (1969-1970) (JPRS 72663, Jan. 19, 1979) and a collection of his speeches (JPRS 72717, Jan. 29, 1979).

The Radical Islamic Ideology of 'Alī Shari'atī

'Alī Shari'atī (1934-1977), the principal ideologist of current Islamic radicalism in Iran, was a French-educated sociologist who died in London two years ago. He was a lay religious and political ideologist with major charismatic qualities. Harassed and imprisoned by the Shah's regime, his ideas continue to have great appeal to the Muslim intellectuals, students and urbanized bourgeoisie of Iran. Like the previous westernized liberal and constitutionalist intellectuals, he also "reinterpreted" Islam, but he did so by transforming it into an ideology of radical political and social transformation. Like his nineteenth-century less radical predecessors, he did so primarily in the tradition of Shi'ī heterodox thought: millenarianism, elitism, and opposition to secular and religious authorities, much more than he did so under the influence of the West.

Several radical ideologies in the underdeveloped world, including in Muslim countries, have tried to mix nationalism (e.g., pan-Arabism) and radical social change: the Ba'ṯh in Syria and Iraq and Nasr's Arab socialism. The Ba'ṯh is neither officially religious or secularist, and Nasr was a Muslim. But Shari'atī was the first to reinterpret Islam to make it an integral part of such an overall radical ideology. He thus theoretically closed the gap between traditionalist and modernizing currents in Iran.

What are the principal similarities and contrasts between the traditionalist Shi'ī mujtahids and Shari'atī? Both embrace Shi'ī Islam. Both reject Western "decadence." Both are millenarian, but Shari'atī's

is earthly, not in heaven. Shari'ati stresses an active, socially radical, politically transforming version of Shi'i Islam, while the ulama have traditionally preached a more passive, contemplative version and have been far from the forefront of rapid social change. He maintains that the ulama have limited Islam to law, while in fact it should be a revolutionary social creed. Capitalist democracy is formal and gives a conservative majority the right to oppress a progressive minority. He wants a kind of "Islamic Protestantism" in which Shi'ism become a religion of protest changing constantly in accord with changing conditions. For him an intellectual can often better understand the truth than an alim (a Muslim priest). Indeed, the intellectuals (Raushanfikr) must have the leading political role, because they are conscious of this problem and because they are close to and aware of the masses but not a part of them. The intellectuals' Weltanschauung must be particular and national, not universal, for the latter is a concept unfortunately imported from Europe. The intellectual elite must dominate and lead the masses through revolution to a classless society. They must often not tell the masses the truth lest it mislead them. The intellectuals themselves must be led by a hero, a charismatic personality (Qahriman), just as the Twelfth Imam will eventually return to lead the Muslims to the perfect society.

Shari'ati's religiosity, whose genuineness is not clear, is religion for the sake of revolution and for the consolidation of a militant cultural identity. Its similarities with some of Lenin's ideas, particularly his elitist organizational ones, are clear. Yet it is fundamentally Islamic, not Leninist. And it is clearly a heady brew. Only if one understands it

can one understand how students, intellectuals, and westernized bourgeoisie seem so Muslim. When they cry in praise of the Āyatullah Khumeynī, many of them are thinking of Shari'atī, acting as they think he would have wanted them to, convinced of the rightness of his ideas and believing that their fulfillment is at hand.⁶

There have been many other causes of the Iranian revolution besides Islam: popular revulsion against tyranny, torture, corruption, the dark

⁶ I make no claim to be an expert on these matters. I have learned some about the historical background from the writings of Prof. Nikki Keddie of UCLA, especially her "Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism," Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 4 (1961-1962), "The Origins of the Religious-Radical Alliance in Iran," Past and Present, July 1966, "The Roots of the Ulama's Power in Modern Iran," Studia Islamica, vol. 29 (1969), "Iran: de l'indépendance à l'opposition politique," Le monde diplomatique, Aug. 1977 and Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn "al-Afghānī" (University of California, 1972), as well as from Hamid Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran," Nikki R. Keddie, ed., Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1800 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 231-255, and Mirzā Malkūm Khān (University of California, 1973), A.J. Arberry, ed., Religion in the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), vol. 2, ch. 5 ("Ithnā 'Ashari Shi'ism and Iranian Islam"); and most of all from two papers by Prof. Mangol Bayat-Philipp of Harvard, "A Phoenix Too Frequent: The Concept of Historical Continuity in Modern Iranian Thought," Asian and African Studies, Summer 1979 and "Continuity and Change in Modern Iranian Thought" in Michael Bonine and Nikki Keddie, eds., Continuity and Change in Modern Iran (forthcoming). For 'Alī Shari'atī, practically none of whose voluminous works have been translated into any western language, I have relied almost entirely on Prof. Bayat's paper, "Shi'ism in Contemporary Iranian Politics: The Case of 'Alī Shari'atī," in Sylvia Haim and Elie Kedourie, eds., Iran: Toward Modernity (London: Frank Cass, 1979). I have also profited greatly from conversations with her. See also Yann Richard, "'Alī Shari'atī, le Précurseur," Les nouvelles littéraires, Dec. 7-14, 1978 (JPRS 77769, Feb. 6, 1979) and especially "Shari'atī et le gouvernement islamique," Le Monde, Jan. 31, 1979.

side of modernization, overwhelming American influence, an enormously expensive foreign and military policy, and the Shah's mixture of repression and then liberalization, and his indecisiveness. What is most new in it, and what can only be understood if one grasps its Islamic component, is the popular appeal of this combination of Islamic faith and social radicalism, above all to urban youth. We are far from having heard the last of it.⁷

⁷ Conversations in Tehran, July 1978. The analyses of Iranian developments by Arnold Hottinger in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung are essential for understanding them, particularly "Die Fehler des Schahs," ibid., Jan. 19, 1979. See also the coverage in Le Monde by Paul Balta and Jean Gueyras; James Bill, "Iran and the Crisis of '79," Foreign Affairs, vol. 57, no. 2 (Winter 1978/1979); Marvin Zonis, "He Took All the Credit, Now He Gets All the Blame," New York Times, Jan. 14, 1979; Richard Cottam, "Goodbye to America's Shah," Foreign Policy, Spring 1979 (particularly interesting re Iranian attitudes toward the U.S.); Walter Laqueur, "Why the Shah Fell," Commentary, Mar. 1979 (very critical of Khomeini); Nicholas Gage, "Iran: Making of a Revolution," The New York Times Magazine, Dec. 17, 1978; Jean-Claude Guillebaud, "Les troubles en Iran," Le Monde, Apr. 6, 1978; and "The crumbling triangle," The Economist, Dec. 9, 1978. For the Shah's system, see Robert Graham, Iran. The Illusion of Power (New York: St. Martin's, 1978.) One of the most penetrating analyses of the Iranian revolution, in my view, is the following:

"... For it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolutions break out. On the contrary, it oftener happens that when a people which has put up with an oppressive rule over a long period without protest suddenly finds the government relaxing its pressure, it takes up arms against it. Thus the social order overthrown by a revolution is almost always better than the one immediately preceding it, and experience teaches us that, generally speaking, the most perilous moment for a bad government is one when it seeks to mend its ways. Only consummate statecraft can enable a King to save his throne when after a long spell of oppressive rule he sets to improving the lot of his subjects. Patiently endured so long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men's minds. . . ."--Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, tr. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Anchor, 1955), pp. 176-177.

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1. Summary: If characteristics can be attributed to nations, one of the most blatant Persian traits is the inability to accept responsibility for anything that turns out badly. With only a few exceptions, much of the post revolution rhetoric and sub rosa commentary in Iran today is aimed pointedly at the U.S.A. End summary.

2. Attacks by the Winners: Khomeini leads the presently-in-power-pointing-finger group with an almost daily blast at the U.S.A. According to Khomeini, the U.S.A. was responsible for the Shah's excesses and for just about everything else wrong with Iran. The U.S.A. is still working to destroy Iran and all of the trouble in the economy, as well as the regional fighting is tied to Satanic Uncle Sam. A host of other orators echo Khomeini's line, and every day sees a new accusation in the press. Among others, charges against America include: Having her eyes on Iran's oil (Khomeini); being responsible for the suffering of the Baluchi peoples (Ayatollah Khameneyi); not wanting peace to return to Iran (Khomeini)' stirring up trouble among the Kurds in Turkey (the People's Fedayan); plotting with SAVAK to kill a whole series of journalists, religious and political figures (Keyhan newspaper), etc.

The list goes on and on. The search for a scapegoat for all of Iran's ills ^{only} is not limited to the U.S.A.

4. Israel, the UK and the USSR have also come in for a share, albeit relatively minor, of the political and religious tirades. The Shah was, ^{however} ~~after all~~, totally under U.S. control as far as the Khomeini party

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is concerned, and the U.S. must take the major blame.

3. Attacks by the losers: Receiving less press publicity, but nevertheless constantly being repeated sub rosa is an almost paradoxical type of blame casting. Several of the revolutionary winners are being accused by their opponents of being under USA control. The statements made by Prof. Bill in TIME Magazine about Dep Pri Min Entezam and Dep Pri Min Yazdi marked the start of a whole series of attacks on the characters of these and other revolutionary figures. The publicized version of AF Gen Rabii's quote confession end quote also put the USA in a blame worthy light. In his testimony, Rabii claimed that Gen Huyser, and thus by unwritten extrapolation the USA, was responsible for forcing the Shah out of Iran and preventing a pro-Shah coup by the Armed Forces. Emboffs are constantly queried by friends and contacts re the USA's quote real role end quote in formenting the revolution. Even Khomeini has been linked to the CIA/USA in many conversations. The long personal ties of such leaders as Yazdi, Entezam and Ghohtzadeh, not to mention a host of other less well known provincial revolutionary leaders to the USA only adds fuel to this particular fire. The training of many of the rabidly revolutionary and pivotal homofars in the USA is also looked on with suspicion by those who have lost all, or fear that they soon will. In general the thesis most bruited by this group of accusers is that the US sacrificed the Shah in order to establish an Islamic and therefore ^{anti-} ~~anti-~~ Communist regime in Iran. Khomeini is totally under U.S. control as far as many of the revolutionary losers are concerned.

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4. It is difficult to ascertain what long range effect the anti-US accusations will have on Iranian attitudes towards the USA. Almost every literate Iranian believes the USA played a major role in the revolutionary process here. Despite all of their accusations, however, the personal commitment felt by a vast number of Iranians to the USA seems not to be decreasing. After the most ^{VITUPERATIVE} attack on the pro-Shah or pro-revolution stance of the US, it is almost absurdly typical for the ~~attacker~~ ^{POSSIBILITIES} to inquire about visa ~~possibilities~~, or to proudly mention his many relatives presently residing in California. It also seems impossible for Iranians to believe that Americans might have reasons to be negative in their feelings towards them. After all, when ~~the~~ ^{THEY HAVE ERASED THE} last traces of American influence in Iran ~~are erased~~, the revolutionaries still fully intend to study or retire in the USA.

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
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SUBJ: LOOKING AHEAD: PART II: CURRENT SITUATION

REF: A) TEHRAN 4025 NOTAL, B) TEHRAN 2681 NOTAL,
C) TERHAN 2682 NOTAL, D) TEHRAN 4253 NOTAL,
E) ISLAMABAD 4517 NOTAL

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT) THIS IS A REPORTING TELEGRAM

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2. SUMMARY: FOR NOW, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, WHICH IS ITSELF ON THE VERGE OF FRAGMENTATION, HAS POSITION; THE MOST CHARISMATIC LEADER; AND THE BEST, THOUGH SPLIT AND CONFUSED, ORGANIZATION. ALL OTHER GROUPS HAVE LIABILITIES TOO, BUT SOME HAVE MORE POTENTIAL FOR EVENTUAL EFFECTIVE ACTION TO ESTABLISH THE BASIC PREREQUISITES FOR GAINING AND HOLDING POWER. BARRING A RANDOM CATASTROPHIC EVENT, SUCH AS ASSASSINATION OF KEY LEADERS, IRAN MAY HAVE AS MUCH AS TWO MONTHS BEFORE THE NEXT SERIOUS ARMED CONTEST FOR POWER OCCURS. UNLESS ONE GROUP CAN CONSOLIDATE ITS POSITION WITHOUT SERIOUS CHALLENGE FROM OTHERS OR OVERCOME THE SERIOUS FRAGMENTATION OF VALUES WITH A UNIFYING PROGRAM, THE OUTLOOK WILL BE CHAOS AND THE EVENTUAL EMERGENCE OF AN AUTHORITARIAN LEADER IN THE MOLD OF IRAN'S STRONG MONARCHS OF THE TRADITIONAL PAST. END SUMMARY.

3. FROM A BROAD PERSPECTIVE, THE FIRST GROUP TO HAVE A SHOT AT CONSOLIDATING POWER IS THE PRESENT BIFURCATED ISLAMIC MOVEMENT/GOVERNMENT. KHOMEINI'S CHARISMA IS STRONG ENOUGH TO MAINTAIN A SEMBLANCE OF ORDER FOR AWHILE, AT LEAST UNTIL ONE OF THE CHALLENGERS BUILDS UP A BETTER ORGANIZATION. WHILE A VAST MAJORITY OF IRANIANS PROBABLY NOW SUPPORT KHOMEINI, GROUPS HAVE RETREATED FROM THEIR REVOLUTIONARY STANCE OF SUPPORT, AND MORE WILL DO SO AS KHOMEINI IS FORCED BY CIRCUMSTANCES TO CLARIFY HIS AIMS AND POLICIES. BROAD GENERALIZATIONS ON THE NATURE OF AN ISLAMIC STATE AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF FOREIGNERS OR REACTIONARIES FOR ALL THAT IS BAD WILL ONLY GO SO FAR; NEITHER PROVIDES A FIRM BASIS FOR AUTHORITATIVE DECISION-MAKING BY THE PGOI. MOST IMMEDIATE TASKS FACING ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ARE TO ORGANIZE POLITICAL AND MILITARY POWER BASE (AT LEAST AS FAST OR FASTER THAN THEIR COMPETITION); GET THE ECONOMY MOVING (AT LEAST BY REDUCING UNEMPLOYMENT); ESTABLISH A CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE COUNTRY CAN LIVE WITH; AND BUILD UNITY AROUND A SET OF POLICIES THAT A MAJORITY WILL SUPPORT. ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OCCUPIES THE POLITICAL HIGH GROUND -- IT IS THE INCUMBENT GOVERNMENT AND POSSESSES WHAT LEGITIMACY THERE IS IN IRAN THROUGH ITS LEADER, KHOMEINI. IT HAS SUBSTANTIAL LIABILITIES, TOO, HOWEVER. THE DUAL STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT IS A SERIOUS HANDICAP TO DEVELOPING UNITY OF POLICY AND POWER. THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE MOSQUES ARE STRONG IN THEIR ABILITY TO MOBILIZE PEOPLE FOR STREET ACTION, BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE THE INSTITUTIONAL BASE TO MESH WELL IN A GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE. THE MOSQUE COMMITTEES, THEREFORE, ARE NOT THE UNQUALIFIED

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ASSET MANY BELIEVE, FOR THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, NO ONE HAS ANY BETTER ORGANIZATION. THE MOVEMENT ESPOUSES VALUES, INSOFAR AS THEY HAVE BEEN DEFINED, THAT ARE TACITLY ACCEPTED BY A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE, BUT CERTAINLY NOT EVEN A SUBSTANTIAL MINORITY OF THE MODERNIZED ELITE, A KEY GROUP FOR CARRYING OUT BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROGRAMS OVER THE MEDIUM TERM. THE NIGHTMARE OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WOULD BE A SPLIT WITHIN RELIGIOUS RANKS, WITH AYATOLLAHS ON EACH SIDE. THIS WOULD SHATTER KHOMEINI'S CHARISMA AND WEAKEN THE UNITY OF THE MOVEMENT, PERHAPS BEYOND REPAIR.

4. THE MARXIST FEDAYEEN HAVE THEIR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AS WELL. ON THE ASSET SIDE, THE FEDAYEEN PROBABLY HAVE THE BEST TYPE OF ORGANIZATION FOR MOBILIZING PEOPLE AROUND A UNITY OF PURPOSE FOR DIRECT VIOLENT ACTION. THEIR VALUES APPEAL TO MANY OF THE MODERNIZED ELITE (REF A AND B), ESPECIALLY AS THE CONTRAST WITH KHOMEINI'S PROGRAMS BECOMES MORE CLEAR, TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE FEDAYEEN. THE MOVEMENT IS WEAK IN ACTUAL NUMBERS AND ORGANIZATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. IT CURRENTLY HAS NO FIRST-CLASS NATIONALLY RESPECTED LEADERS (THOUGH IT MAY DEVELOP SOME) AND IT IS THE TARGET OF IDEOLOGICAL SNIPING FROM MARXIST SPLINTER GROUPS. TO BE A THREAT IN THE NEAR TERM, THE FEDAYEEN MUST ORGANIZE SUPERBLY WELL AND FORM THE RIGHT COALITION TO BE IN POSITION TO TAKE ADVANTAGE IF AND WHEN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT STUMBLES BADLY OR SPLITS. WE HAVE LITTLE HARD INFORMATION ON THE FOREIGN CONNECTIONS OF THE FEDAYEEN, BUT THEIR ACCESSION TO POWER WOULD MOST PROBABLY OCCUR IN SUCH A WAY AS TO FORCE THEM RATHER SWIFTLY INTO DEPENDENCE ON EXTERNAL FORCES SYMPATHETIC TO THEM -- THE PLO, THE USSR, LIBYA.

5. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT: MATIN-DAFTARI'S NDF IS A POTENTIAL CHALLENGER IN TERMS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC IDEAS WHICH WOULD PROBABLY COMMAND A STRONG FOLLOWING AMONG REVOLUTIONARY URBAN SECULARISTS AND THE ESSENTIALLY NONPOLITICAL (UNTIL NOW) MODERNIZING ELITE. UNFORTUNATELY THE NDF IS SERIOUSLY DEFICIENT IN MILITARY POWER, AND EVEN WEAKER IN NATION-WIDE ORGANIZATION THAN THE MARXIST PARTIES. UNLESS IT ENTERED INTO AN ALLIANCE WITH SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT WHO WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT A CHURCH-STATE SPLIT, IT WILL NOT BE A FORCE IN EITHER THE SHORT OR LONG TERM. AS AN ALLY OF THE FEDAYEEN, IT WOULD BE SWALLOWED UP WITHOUT A TRACE ONCE THAT GROUP CAME TO POWER.

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6. THE NATIONAL FRONT(NF): WITH THE RESIGNATION OF KARIM SANJABI AS FOREIGN MINISTER, THE NF REGAINS ITS PRINCIPAL LEADER. REAL QUESTION IS HOW MORIBUND IS THE NF? IT PLAYED A HANGER-ON ROLE IN THE FINAL DAYS OF THE REVOLUTION, HAS NO INDEPENDENT MILITARY STRENGTH, AND HAS EXHIBITED PRACTICALLY NO INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ACTIVITY SINCE LATE FEBRUARY. TWO SOURCES TELL US MANY FRONT SUPPORTERS DEFECTED TO THE NDF, AND THIS WAS ONE MOTIVATING FACTOR IN SANJABI'S RESIGNATION TO RETURN TO POLITICS. IF THE NF IS TO FIGURE AT ALL, IT MUST DO A REMARKABLE REBUILDING JOB AND/OR FORM AN ALLIANCE WITH THE IDEOLOGICALLY COMPATIBLE NDF.

7. THE IRANIAN MILITARY: FOR THE MOMENT, THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES ARE THE CURRENT PRIZE IN THE GAME OF POLITICS, NOT AN INDEPENDENT COUNTER. THOUGH VIRTUALLY BEREFT OF LEADERSHIP, ARMED FORCES ARE THE ONLY GROUP WITH SOLID PROFESSIONAL TRAINING AND AN ACCUSTOMED COMMAND STRUCTURE (REF C). PGOI IS TRYING TO REBUILD THE ARMY IN AN ISLAMIC IMAGE WITH NEW OR QUOTE PURE UNQUOTE OFFICERS. SHOULD IT FAIL TO SO DO, OR SHOULD MILITARY OFFICERS AND SENIOR ENLISTED MEN BECOME DISILLUSIONED WITH THE EMERGING VALUES AND POLICIES OF THE REGIME, IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT THE ARMED FORCES WILL EMERGE AS AN INDEPENDENT FORCE LATER. SUCH A POINT IS PROBABLY AT LEAST SIX MONTHS AWAY. MANY MILITARY MEN HAVE QUIETLY EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH ONE FACET OR ANOTHER OF THE REVOLUTION.

8. THE REST OF THE RIGHT: REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA TO THE CONTRARY, THERE REMAINS A SIGNIFICANT, THOUGH CURRENTLY QUIET, RESEVOIR OF SUPPORT FOR THE MODERIZING POLITICS OF THE SHAH, IF NOT FOR THE MONARCHICAL SYSTEM. THESE ELEMENTS MAY FOLD THEMSELVES INTO ONE OF THE SECULAR ALTERNATIVES -- FEDAYEEN, NDF, NF -- BUT THEY COULD, IN A FEW WEEKS TIME, CAUSE SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF TROUBLE FOR ANY GROUP OR PERSON TRYING TO PUT A POLITICAL ACT TOGETHER (INDEED THE PGOI GRUDGINGLY AND PRIVATELY ADMITS THIS IS THE CASE IN AZARBAIJAN AND TURKESTAN NOW). THE MONARCHICAL RIGHT IS STILL IN SHOCK. IT MAY NEVER FULLY EMERGE. FEW OF THIS STRIKE ENTERTAIN FOR A MINUTE ANY ILLUSIONS OF BRINGING BACK THE MONARCHY IN ITS PAST FORM. FACED WITH THE TRAPPINGS OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, HOWEVER, THIS GROUP INCLUDING A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN THE PROVINCES, COULD PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FOR SOME

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OTHER ALTERNATIVE. THERE ARE ALREADY HINTS THAT THOSE OF THIS PERSUASION HAVE PROVIDED MANPOWER FOR THE KILL-A-MULL TODAY GROUPS WHICH HAVE SURFACED ENOUGH TO DISTRIBUTE HANDBILLS IN SEVERAL AREAS, AND MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE KILLING OF GENERAL QARANI. THERE IS ENOUGH ANTI-CLERICAL FEELING IN CERTAIN QUARTERS OF IRAN WHICH COULD, IF CONDITIONS BECOME RIGHT, BE TRANSLATED INTO VIOLENT REACTIONS TO AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY IF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS AND OTHER ENEMY-CREATING ACTIVITIES OF THE KHOMEINI COMMITTEES CONTINUE. THE OCCASIONAL STATEMENTS FROM THE PGOI THAT A GENERAL AMNESTY WILL BE PROCLAIMED HAVE FALLEN ON CYNICAL EARS. SUCH A DECISION TO DO AWAY WITH THE EXECUTIONS (IF NOT THE TRIALS) WOULD EASE THE SITUATION, BUT NOT REVERSE IT.

9. NEAR TERM PROJECTIONS: THE GIGANTIC ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS WHICH FACE ALL CONTENDERS FOR PLACE AND POWER IN THE SHATTERED IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE PROBABLY MEAN THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL TRIGGERING EVENT (KHOMEINI'S DEATH, FOR EXAMPLE) IRAN MAY LIMP ALONG FOR THE NEXT TWO TO FOUR MONTHS MARRED BY LOW-LEVEL VIOLENCE RESULTING FROM CURRENT DISORGANIZATION AND SHARP VALUE CONFLICT (REF D). WE WOULD RATE THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT'S CHANCES OF QUOTE MUDDLING THROUGH UNQUOTE BEYOND THAT POINT SLIGHTLY LESS THAN 50-50, LARGELY BECAUSE OF ITS ORGANIZATIONAL DISARRAY. POSSESSED OF ALL THE ADVANTAGES OF GOVERNMENT AS A CHARISMATIC LEADER, KHOMEINI SOMETIMES SEEMS BENT ON SNATCHING DEFEAT FROM THE JAWS OF VICTORY. HIS RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMY AND HIS CRITICISM OF THOSE WHO HAVE ATTACKED CLERICS SOUND A BIT LIKE THE SHRILL NOTE OF A MAN WHO HAS BELATEDLY DISCOVERED THAT HIS GAME PLAN IS A MISHMASH. (WE DO NOT SHARE THE PAK VIEW OF IRAN'S CURRENT CHAOS AS KHOMEINI-DESIRED AND INSPIRED (REF E)). VIRTUALLY ALL OUR SOURCES CLOSE TO THE RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT DESCRIBE KHOMEINI AS INCREDIBLY NAIVE ABOUT THE MECHANICS OF GOVERNING POLITICS, AND HIS TREATMENT OF THE PGOI AND BAZARGAN HAS PROVOKED ULCERS AND CHAGRIN THE WIDTH AND BREADTH OF THE CABINET. UNLESS THE PGOI CAN GET MORE CONTROL OF EVENTS AND START TO MOVE MORE RAPIDLY (WHICH BAZARGAN CLAIMS HE DOES NOT WISH TO DO), THEN THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WILL SQUANDER THE POLITICAL HEADSTART IT ACHIEVED AS THE VANGUARD OF THE REVOLUTION. FOR NOW, THE BALL IS IN KHOMEINI'S COURT; FROM A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE HE HAS

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NOT PLAYED IT VERY SMARTLY SO FAR. PROBABLY THE BEST INDICATOR OF WHETHER THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WILL SURVIVE AS THE DOMINANT FORCE IN IRANIAN POLITICS WILL BE HOW WELL ALL HANDS CAN IMPROVE UPON THEIR PERFORMANCE TO DATE.

10. THERE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE AT LEAST ONE MORE CHALLENGE TO THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, PERHAPS MORE IF IT REMAINS WEAK AND DIVIDED AND OTHERS GAIN IN STRENGTH. THE FEDAYEEN WILL ALMOST SURELY LEAD A MARXIST COALITION INTO BATTLE AFTER AN APPROPRIATE PERIOD OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY. THIS STRUGGLE MAY BEGIN SLOWLY ON ISSUES WHERE THE FEDAYEEN HAVE BUILT-IN ADVANTAGE WITH GROUPS THEY ARE TRYING TO ORGANIZE -- ELECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION, RIGHTS FOR WOMEN, AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS. THE FEDAYEEN STAND TO BE THE BIGGEST GAINERS IF THE PGOI FALLS ON ITS FACE IN REVIVING THE ECONOMY AND FULFILLING THE WANTS OF ITS FOLLOWERS. THERE IS A REAL DANGER THAT IT WILL BE THE MAGNET FOR DISSIDENTS RATHER THAN THE MODERATE NDF, NF AND THE OTHERS WHICH WILL RISE AND FALL.

11. BECAUSE OF THE FRAGMENTATION OF VALUES, AUTHORITY AND POWER, POLITICS IN IRAN IS A MUCH MORE SITUATIONAL ACTIVITY THAN IN MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. GIVEN EVENTS WILL HAVE DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ON LONG-TERM PROSPECTS. THE LATITUDE FOR CHANGE IS WIDER THAN MOST REVOLUTIONARY SITUATIONS. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, KHOMEINI CAN SHEILD BAZARGAN FOR JUST SO LONG BEFORE THE SHEILD SHATTERS OR TATTERS. THE PGOI MUST SHOW RESULTS SOON TO FORESHORTEN THE PERIOD OF RELATIVE CALM AND PLUNGE IRAN*** SURVIVE. KHOMEINI'S OR BAZARGAN'S DEATH WOULD IMMEDIATELY FORESHORTEN THE PERIOD OF RELATIVE CALM AND PLUNGE IRAN'S POLITICAL GROUPS INTO AN ARMED STRUGGLE FOR POWER, READY OR NOT. THE OUTCOME, IF IT OCCURS WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS WOULD BE CHAOS, FOLLOWED BY THE EMERGENCE OF AN AUTHORITATIAN FIGURE OF EITHER RIGHT OR LEFT, WHO WOULD BECOME BY SOME NAME, A NEW EDITION OF THE VERY AUTHORITAR- IAN REZA SHAH WITH AT LEAST SOME RELIGIOUS CREDENTIALS. IT IS AN EERIE FEELING INDEED TO HEAR LAST MONTH'S DEMOCRATS TALK OF THE GROWING NEED FOR STRONG LEADERSHIP. NAAS##

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E.O. 12865: RDS-4 5/2/89 (BINNS, J.R.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT IR UK
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT ON IRAN

REF: (A) STATE 96936 (B) STATE 105473 (C) LONDON 7820

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT) THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MET MAY 1 IN LONDON TO PREPARE AN UP-TO-DATE ASSESSMENT ON IRAN. THIS REPORT IS NOW AVAILABLE IN INR AND REFLECTS RESPONSES TO SOME OF THE QUESTIONS FLAGGED IN REF A. OTHER QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO THE DEPARTMENT ARE NOT TREATED OWING TO LACK OF RAW MATERIAL AVAILABLE TO HMG AND TO THE USG.

2. THE BRITISH HAVE HAD NO DIRECT CONTACTS WITH KHOMEINI (REF B). RECENTLY, HOWEVER, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN TEHRAN DID SEE HIM AND CONVEYED HIS IMPRESSIONS TO AMBASSADOR GRAHAM. WE ARE TOLD THAT THE FRENCHMAN FOUND THE AYATOLLAH LUCID AND COHERENT. (PARIS 13410).

BREWSTER
BT
#8782

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